博弈论、信息经济学与会计信息失真研究
本站原创 论文中文摘要：随着经济的不断发展,会计信息的作用日益重要,而令人尴尬的是,会计信息的质量却与经济的发展背道而驰。更为严重的是,失真的会计信息已经引起了许多不容忽视的问题:会计信息本来是指导利益相关者做出正确决策的基础,而失真的会计信息却诱导他们做出了错误的决策;提供真实的会计信息有利于市场诚信体系的建立健全,而失真的会计信息充斥着会计信息市场,不断的将高质量的会计信息挤出,形成了会计信息柠檬市场,严重地影响了社会主义市场经济的健全和完善;真实的会计信息可以用于评价企业或者行业发展的状况,以使政府管制部门制定相应的宏观经济发展政策,失真的会计信息不能真实反映这些情况,不但导致国有资产流失,甚至已经影响到了政府对宏观经济发展政策的制定;真实的会计信息反应了企业真实的发展状况,真实的投入产出水平和核心竞争力,虚假失真的会计信息使得企业为了赢得市场份额而包装自己,从而产生了恶性竞争,公平有序的市场竞争秩序被打破,也阻碍了市场机制的不断完善,更进一步地严重影响了资源的有效配置,使整个社会的发展停滞不前。由此可见,研究如何治理会计信息失真,在最大限度内保证会计信息的真实性具有很重要的现实意义。本文就是以会计信息失真的治理为中心而展开研究的。本文共四章。第一章主要是介绍当前对会计信息失真研究的现状和不足,从不同层面说明本文研究的重要意义。第二章首先对会计信息失真的含义进行了界定,明确了所要研究的对象,在此基础上对会计信息失真进行分类,并借鉴吴联生的研究成果将会计信息失真分为两类:会计信息规则性失真与会计信息违规性失真,这部分内容的工作将使得整个论文的研究对象更为具体。第三章运用相关理论和成本——收益的分析方法对会计信息规则性失真和违规性失真的成因进行了研究。本部分分析的结果认为会计信息规则性失真之所以存在,从微观层面上讲,原因在于会计准则及其会计制度自身的不完善,从宏观层面上讲,其原因主要是会计域秩序与会计规则间存在偏差。而对会计信息违规性失真而言,委托关系是其产生的客观基础,委托人、人效用函数不一致和信息不对称是其产生的必要条件,而违规净收益、会计诚信的缺失以及执法监督力度等因素是促使其产生的动因。这部分的工作实际上主要是建立一个研究会计信息失真产生的一般性的逻辑分析框架,它的重要意义则是为后文运用博弈理论和信息经济学理论两个工具,有针对性地对会计信息失真治理的分析研究奠定了基础。第四章运用博弈理论和信息经济学理论,从各个层面上研究了会计信息失真的治理途径,因此这部分是全文的重点也是难点。这部分内容又分为两个小的组成部分,第一部分是运用博弈理论对会计信息规则性失真的治理的分析研究。为了矫正会计规则与会计域秩序之间存在的偏差,在这部分,首先尝试寻找建立会计域秩序的途径,只要建立的会计域秩序,才有可能与会计规则进行对照找比较。这部分研究的具体思路是,先界定并分析利益相关者,在此基础上,通过博弈演进的方式,对利益相关者组成的博弈或者子博弈模型进行分析,在设定博弈均衡目标的前提下,不断的修改各博弈方的博弈策略,并最终通过博弈矩阵对为建立会计域秩序所需的均衡条件进行分析与研究,在整个分析与研究的过程中,渗透着博弈论的思想,同时还将治理会计信息失真的对策穿插其中。接下来,为了解决会计准则制定的问题,本文分别从准则制定者(政府)和准则执行者(企业)层面,对会计准则的制定和执行问题进行了探讨。这部分亦渗透了博弈论的思想,同时运用经济学中的成本——效益分析方法,以准则制定者和准则执行者为研究对象,通过建立一个几何模型,为治理会计信息规则性失真提出了一个思路,几何模型直观明了的显示了会计准则制定过程中,“帕累托最优”的存在性和可能性分。这部分内容的最后,本文又补充说明了会计准则执行过程中所必须面对的两个问题:会计政策选择和盈余管理,由于这不是本文论述的主要内容,因此只是简要的加以叙述。第二部分主要是运用信息经济学理论对会计信息违规性失真深层次原因进行分析,为会计信息违规性失真的治理的分析研究提供了一个立体框架。首先将研究客体具体化为会计信息供给者和会计信息需求者。从会计信息供给者角度进行研究,受到科斯《社会成本问题》一文的启发,针对会计信息供给者提供的虚假的会计信息对会计信息需求者所造成的负外部性以及对整个社会成本的影响,本文从两个角度——会计信息质量的衡量和会计信息需求者负外部性转移出发,就如何有效地抑制会计信息供给者提供虚假会计信息的行为做了分析与研究。关于会计信息质量的衡量问题,本文在借鉴大量研究成果的基础上,通过建立数学模型的方式,在一系列假设条件的基础上,从量化的角度提出了衡量会计信息质量的方法,而这样的方法更有依据,更有说服力。针对会计信息需求者负外部性的转移问题,本文仍然是通过建立数学模型的方式,寻找解决负外部性转移的条件和途径,为了对数学模型的分析过程加以说明,同时还结合几何图形进行从更为直观的角度进行解说。最后的研究结果认为,对会计信息供给者设置会计信息最低质量保证金可以有效地抑制其提供虚假会计信息的行为。相应地,从会计信息需求者角度进行研究,针对使用会计信息过程中存在的搭便车行为对整个会计信息市场以及整个社会诚信体系建设的负面影响,受奥尔森《集体行动的逻辑》一文的启发,本文也试图将个体行为置于某个集体中进行分析研究后,提出了会计信息供给临界点机制的概念,为了是论述显得有根据,有说服力,在此部分也通过建立数学模型的方式对会计信息供给临界点机制加以说明,最终本文认为,通过会计信息供给临界点机制可以有效地抑制使用者搭便车的行为
Abstract（英文摘要）： With the economic development, the function of accounting information(AI) is more important, but, embarrassedly, the quality of AI is the very reverse with economic development, more seriously, distorted AI causes much inconvincible problem. AI is originally of help to stakeholders’decision-making, now AI induces them to be wrong. Genuine information(GI) provision is in for of market credit system’s establishment and perfection, but distorted accounting information(DAI) floods in the market, ceaselessly pile out high-quality AI, engender AI lemon market, badly cumber to realize the socialist market economy. GI can be used to evaluate corporation and industry in for of the government to institute policy of economic development, but, DAI can not. Distorted information makes state-owned assets loss, and even worse, it influences the government to command the economic status.GI indicates the true condition of the corporation, including the scale, input-output level and core competition, DAI makes corporation to disguise in order to take up the market, so that, ill competition engenders, the market order is destroyed, market mechani can not be perfected, worse still, it severely influences the collocation and the societal development. By this token,it has practical significance to study the countermeasure to AID and to furthest ensure the authenticity of AI. This dissertation is focused on the solution to accounting information distortion(AID).There are four chapters in this dissertation. Chapter 1 mainly introduces current study and their deficiency, then expounds the grand meaning of this dissertation. Chapter 2 firstly defines the AI and illuminates the disquisitive objection, on this base, divide AID into two types:regulation distortion(RD) and rule-violating distortion(RVD) with reference of WU Lian-sheng. This part will make the disquisitive objection more precisely. Chapter 3 uses cost-benefit method to analyze the causes of RD and RVD. From micro-level, the cause of RD is faultiness of accounting standards(AS) and accounting institution, macroscopically dues to the inconsistent between accounting rules and accounting order. As for RVD, principal-agent relationship is the objective basis, the incompatibility of utility function and asymmetric information between principle and agent are the essential conditions, and the bigger net income of violating the rules, the lack of accounting honest-credit system and insufficient enforcement and supervision are the direct motivations. This part aims to set up a general logic analytical frame for AID study, its significance is to establish a foundation for the latter analyses which uses Game theory and information economics theory.Chapter 4 studies the countermeasures to AID from each level in use of Game theory and information economics theory, so this part is the keystone and difficulty. This part is composed by two parts, the first one mainly uses game theory to discuss RD. In order to remove the deviation between the accounting order and accounting rule, it must to find a way to establish accounting order then to compare with accounting rule and detects the deviation. The thought is to ascertain and discuss the stakeholders firstly, then to analyze the game model through game evolution. On the precondition of equilibrium, modify the game strategy and Game-matrix to find out the condition which the accounting order needs. In the whole analyses and research, it integrate the think of game theory, meanwhile, it combines the countermeasures. The next to discuss constitution and enforcement of accounting standards issues from the government and the enterprise level respectively. This part makes the standards constitutor and executor as objection, uses Game theory and the cost-benefit analytical method to put forward a way to solve RD through a geometrical model. The geometrical model directly indicates the existence and probability of pareto optimal in the course of standards formation. In the end of this part, the dissertation briefly explains two question of standards enforcement: accounting policy choice and earning management. The second part mainly uses information economics theory to analyze the profound reasons of RVD, and provides a two-dimensional framework for solving RVD. Firstly, make the accounting information provider(AIP) and accounting information users(AIU) as the study object. From AIP aspect, enlightened by The problem of social cost of Coase, this dissertation discusses the negative externality which is taken by distorted AI and the influence to the whole society, then elaborates the countermeasures to hold the behior of AIP from two aspects: accounting information quantitative of accounting information quality and negative externality traner. As for accounting information quality, it makes a mathematical model on the foundation of abundant reference through a series assumption to weigh the accounting information quality. This method is reasonable and persuasion. As for externality traner, this dissertation find the solution through mathematical model too, meanwhile, uses many geometrical graphics to explain the course. At last, bring forward the bail of the lowest accounting information quality to restrain the behior of accounting information provider’s false accounting information provision behior. Accordingly, from AIU aspect, this dissertation analyzes the ill affection, which is taken by free-riding behior of AIU, to the whole accounting information market and social credit system, enlightened by The logic of collective action of Olson, it tries to discuss the individual into collectivity, bring forward the critical point mechani of supply. Convincingly, this part makes use of mathematical model to elaborate the critical point mechani of supply. In the end, the solution is that through critical point mechani of supply, it can effectively curb AIU’s free-riding behior and AIU’s and unassailably to improve accounting information quality.
论文关键词： 会计信息失真；博弈论；信息经济学；最低质量保证金；供给临界点；
Key words（英文摘要）： accounting information distortion；bail of the lowest quality；critical point of supply；
Abstract（英文摘要）： With the economic development, the function of accounting information(AI) is more important, but, embarrassedly, the quality of AI is the very reverse with economic development, more seriously, distorted AI causes much inconvincible problem. AI is originally of help to stakeholders’decision-making, now AI induces them to be wrong. Genuine information(GI) provision is in for of market credit system’s establishment and perfection, but distorted accounting information(DAI) floods in the market, ceaselessly pile out high-quality AI, engender AI lemon market, badly cumber to realize the socialist market economy. GI can be used to evaluate corporation and industry in for of the government to institute policy of economic development, but, DAI can not. Distorted information makes state-owned assets loss, and even worse, it influences the government to command the economic status.GI indicates the true condition of the corporation, including the scale, input-output level and core competition, DAI makes corporation to disguise in order to take up the market, so that, ill competition engenders, the market order is destroyed, market mechani can not be perfected, worse still, it severely influences the collocation and the societal development. By this token,it has practical significance to study the countermeasure to AID and to furthest ensure the authenticity of AI. This dissertation is focused on the solution to accounting information distortion(AID).There are four chapters in this dissertation. Chapter 1 mainly introduces current study and their deficiency, then expounds the grand meaning of this dissertation. Chapter 2 firstly defines the AI and illuminates the disquisitive objection, on this base, divide AID into two types:regulation distortion(RD) and rule-violating distortion(RVD) with reference of WU Lian-sheng. This part will make the disquisitive objection more precisely. Chapter 3 uses cost-benefit method to analyze the causes of RD and RVD. From micro-level, the cause of RD is faultiness of accounting standards(AS) and accounting institution, macroscopically dues to the inconsistent between accounting rules and accounting order. As for RVD, principal-agent relationship is the objective basis, the incompatibility of utility function and asymmetric information between principle and agent are the essential conditions, and the bigger net income of violating the rules, the lack of accounting honest-credit system and insufficient enforcement and supervision are the direct motivations. This part aims to set up a general logic analytical frame for AID study, its significance is to establish a foundation for the latter analyses which uses Game theory and information economics theory.Chapter 4 studies the countermeasures to AID from each level in use of Game theory and information economics theory, so this part is the keystone and difficulty. This part is composed by two parts, the first one mainly uses game theory to discuss RD. In order to remove the deviation between the accounting order and accounting rule, it must to find a way to establish accounting order then to compare with accounting rule and detects the deviation. The thought is to ascertain and discuss the stakeholders firstly, then to analyze the game model through game evolution. On the precondition of equilibrium, modify the game strategy and Game-matrix to find out the condition which the accounting order needs. In the whole analyses and research, it integrate the think of game theory, meanwhile, it combines the countermeasures. The next to discuss constitution and enforcement of accounting standards issues from the government and the enterprise level respectively. This part makes the standards constitutor and executor as objection, uses Game theory and the cost-benefit analytical method to put forward a way to solve RD through a geometrical model. The geometrical model directly indicates the existence and probability of pareto optimal in the course of standards formation. In the end of this part, the dissertation briefly explains two question of standards enforcement: accounting policy choice and earning management. The second part mainly uses information economics theory to analyze the profound reasons of RVD, and provides a two-dimensional framework for solving RVD. Firstly, make the accounting information provider(AIP) and accounting information users(AIU) as the study object. From AIP aspect, enlightened by The problem of social cost of Coase, this dissertation discusses the negative externality which is taken by distorted AI and the influence to the whole society, then elaborates the countermeasures to hold the behior of AIP from two aspects: accounting information quantitative of accounting information quality and negative externality traner. As for accounting information quality, it makes a mathematical model on the foundation of abundant reference through a series assumption to weigh the accounting information quality. This method is reasonable and persuasion. As for externality traner, this dissertation find the solution through mathematical model too, meanwhile, uses many geometrical graphics to explain the course. At last, bring forward the bail of the lowest accounting information quality to restrain the behior of accounting information provider’s false accounting information provision behior. Accordingly, from AIU aspect, this dissertation analyzes the ill affection, which is taken by free-riding behior of AIU, to the whole accounting information market and social credit system, enlightened by The logic of collective action of Olson, it tries to discuss the individual into collectivity, bring forward the critical point mechani of supply. Convincingly, this part makes use of mathematical model to elaborate the critical point mechani of supply. In the end, the solution is that through critical point mechani of supply, it can effectively curb AIU’s free-riding behior and AIU’s and unassailably to improve accounting information quality.
论文关键词： 会计信息失真；博弈论；信息经济学；最低质量保证金；供给临界点；
Key words（英文摘要）： accounting information distortion；bail of the lowest quality；critical point of supply；