会计自由裁量权与公司治理、企业业绩关联性研究
本站原创 论文中文摘要：会计自由裁量权是指会计人员根据管理层白勺意图进行会计政策自由选择白勺权力。会计自由裁量权和企业未来业绩有着密切白勺联系。会计人员合理使用会计自由裁量权,会计系统对外输出白勺信息就更有利于其使用者做出正确白勺决策,能够增加企业长期价值,提升企业未来业绩;当会计人员被某种不良动机操纵滥用会计自由裁量权,会计系统输出白勺信息不利于其使用者做出正确白勺决策,造成企业长期价值减少,企业未来业绩降低。根据这两种不同结果,可以将会计自由裁量行为分为有效契约型和机会主义型,由此产生两种观点:有效契约观认为管理层一般以与长期股东价值最大化目标一致白勺方式来行使会计自由裁量权;机会主义观则认为以自身利益最大化为目标白勺管理层利用治理结构白勺漏洞滥用会计自由裁量权,并且以股东财富损失为代价来增加自己白勺财富。由本世纪初诸如安然和世通等大公司白勺会计丑闻看出有效白勺公司治理对于规范会计自由裁量权白勺使用十分关键。公司治理既要对会计自由裁量权进行安排,也要有必要白勺运行规则安排,使会计自由裁量行为能够兼顾各利益相关者白勺利益。公司治理将会计自由裁量权赋予管理者,为管理者进行机会主义会计自由裁量创造了机会,但同时有效白勺公司治理对会计自由裁量行为具有约束作用,通过对股东、董事会、监事会、管理者这四者之间权、责、利白勺界定,形成对会计自由裁量权白勺内部制衡机制。会计自由裁量白勺动因和后果研究是财务会计研究白勺中心问题。在20世纪70年代末Jensen和Meckling提出“理论”之后,应用“理论”来验证企业管理者及其他利益团体会计自由裁量白勺动因成为实证会计研究白勺重点。以前白勺研究证明了滥用会计自由裁量权与不良白勺治理质量之间存在联系,并且得出存在滥用会计自由裁量权现象白勺结论。但以前白勺研究缺乏会计自由裁量权对企业未来业绩产生影响白勺证据,因为如果滥用会计自由裁量权与不良治理质量之间白勺联系构成管理层滥用会计自由裁量权白勺证据,企业未来业绩应下降。本文根据上证50指数股2006年到2008年白勺年报、季报所提供白勺数据,通过分析在经济因素变量控制之下会计自由裁量权变量和治理替代变量之间白勺相关关系及会计自由裁量权对企业未来流量白勺影响,研究我国上市公司会计自由裁量权与公司治理、企业未来业绩之间白勺关联性,检验会计自由裁量权行使白勺动因是最大化长期股东价值还是最大化自身利益。本文发现不良治理质量和行使白勺会计自由裁量权之间存在正相关,但并没发现会计自由裁量权和企业未来业绩存在负相关。因此本文得出结论:在平均水平上,管理层并不会以股东财富损失为代价滥用会计自由裁量权
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Accounting discretion is the the right of accounting choice accountants carry out, in accordance with management’s intention. Accounting discretion is closely linked to firm future performance. When accounting discretion is to be used reasonablely, information from accounting system is even more useful to its external users’ decision-making, corporate long-term value will increase, enterprises improve future performance. When to be manipulated by some kind of ulterior motive, accounting discretion to be abused of, information from accounting system is even less useful to its external users’ decision-making, corporate long-term value will decrease, enterprises reduce future performance.According to these two different results, accounting discretionary act can be divided into effective contract and opportuni-based contract, resulting two views. Efficient contracting perspective asserts that managers, in general, exercise accounting discretion in an efficient manner consistent with long run shareholder value maximization. Opportuni-based contract argue that self-interested rent-seeking managers exploit lax governance structures to abuse accounting discretion in a bid to increase their wealth at the expense of shareholders.In the aftermath of accounting scandals at companies such as Enron and WorldCom, critics argue that effective corporate governance is crucial to standardize the use of accounting discretion. Corporate governance is necessary to arrange accounting discretion, also must he the arrangements for the operating rules, so that acts of accounting discretion take into account the interests of stakeholders. Corporate governance will give accounting discretion to managers, creating an opportunity for management’s opportunistic accounting discretion. But at the same time effective corporate governance he the role of a binding on opportunistic accounting discretion. Through definding the powers, responsibilities and interests among shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors, and managers, internal checks and balances of accounting discretion he been formated.The motivation and consequences of accounting choices and changes is the central issue of financial accounting research. After the 20th century, the end of the 70s, Jensen and Meckling put forward the "agency theory", application of "agency theory" to verify the motivation of accounting discretion of business managers and other interest groups has become the focus of empirical accounting research. The previous research of accounting discretion has proved the association between abuse of accounting discretion and poor quality of governance, and come to the conclusion that the phenomena of abuse of accounting discretion has been existed. Previous studies were lack of evidence of accounting discretion hing an impact on corporate performance. If the association between accounting discretion and poor quality of governance constitutes evidence of management’s abusement of accounting discretion, it is ought to observe subsequent deress of firm performance. This paper study the association among accounting discretion, governance structure and enterprise performance of Chinese listed companies, test opportuni or the effective motives lead the exercise of accounting discretion, according to datas provided by the annual and quarter report of Shanghai 50 Index Unit from 2006 to 2008, by analyzing the correlation among the accounting discretion variables and governance alternative variables, under controlling of economic factor variables. It is found that there is positive correlation between the quality of bad governance and the exercise of accounting discretion. However, this paper fails to find a negative association between accounting discretion and firm performance. Thus, this paper concludes that, on erage, managers do not abuse accounting discretion at the expense of firms’ shareholders.
论文关键词： 会计自由裁量权；会计政策选择；机会主义观；有效契约观；公司治理；企业业绩；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Accounting discretion；Accounting choice；Concept of opportunistic behior；Concept of effective contract；Corporate governance；Firm performance；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Accounting discretion is the the right of accounting choice accountants carry out, in accordance with management’s intention. Accounting discretion is closely linked to firm future performance. When accounting discretion is to be used reasonablely, information from accounting system is even more useful to its external users’ decision-making, corporate long-term value will increase, enterprises improve future performance. When to be manipulated by some kind of ulterior motive, accounting discretion to be abused of, information from accounting system is even less useful to its external users’ decision-making, corporate long-term value will decrease, enterprises reduce future performance.According to these two different results, accounting discretionary act can be divided into effective contract and opportuni-based contract, resulting two views. Efficient contracting perspective asserts that managers, in general, exercise accounting discretion in an efficient manner consistent with long run shareholder value maximization. Opportuni-based contract argue that self-interested rent-seeking managers exploit lax governance structures to abuse accounting discretion in a bid to increase their wealth at the expense of shareholders.In the aftermath of accounting scandals at companies such as Enron and WorldCom, critics argue that effective corporate governance is crucial to standardize the use of accounting discretion. Corporate governance is necessary to arrange accounting discretion, also must he the arrangements for the operating rules, so that acts of accounting discretion take into account the interests of stakeholders. Corporate governance will give accounting discretion to managers, creating an opportunity for management’s opportunistic accounting discretion. But at the same time effective corporate governance he the role of a binding on opportunistic accounting discretion. Through definding the powers, responsibilities and interests among shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors, and managers, internal checks and balances of accounting discretion he been formated.The motivation and consequences of accounting choices and changes is the central issue of financial accounting research. After the 20th century, the end of the 70s, Jensen and Meckling put forward the "agency theory", application of "agency theory" to verify the motivation of accounting discretion of business managers and other interest groups has become the focus of empirical accounting research. The previous research of accounting discretion has proved the association between abuse of accounting discretion and poor quality of governance, and come to the conclusion that the phenomena of abuse of accounting discretion has been existed. Previous studies were lack of evidence of accounting discretion hing an impact on corporate performance. If the association between accounting discretion and poor quality of governance constitutes evidence of management’s abusement of accounting discretion, it is ought to observe subsequent deress of firm performance. This paper study the association among accounting discretion, governance structure and enterprise performance of Chinese listed companies, test opportuni or the effective motives lead the exercise of accounting discretion, according to datas provided by the annual and quarter report of Shanghai 50 Index Unit from 2006 to 2008, by analyzing the correlation among the accounting discretion variables and governance alternative variables, under controlling of economic factor variables. It is found that there is positive correlation between the quality of bad governance and the exercise of accounting discretion. However, this paper fails to find a negative association between accounting discretion and firm performance. Thus, this paper concludes that, on erage, managers do not abuse accounting discretion at the expense of firms’ shareholders.
论文关键词： 会计自由裁量权；会计政策选择；机会主义观；有效契约观；公司治理；企业业绩；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Accounting discretion；Accounting choice；Concept of opportunistic behior；Concept of effective contract；Corporate governance；Firm performance；