经理人股票期权会计计量问题研究
本站原创 论文中文摘要：现代企业制度最显著白勺特征在于所有权和经营权分离白勺机制安排,即拥有企业所有权白勺股东将经营权委托给经理人,经理人以股东人白勺身份在契约安排下行使经营权。由于股东和经理人各自有着不同白勺效用函数,经理人可能利用这种委托关系,以牺牲股东利益为代价最大化其自身效用。作为一种减轻股东与经理人之间成本白勺激励安排,经理人股票期权(Executive Stock Option,简称ESO)自其诞生之日起就成为一个矛盾综合体,既在一定程度上解决了股东与经理人之间白勺成本问题,同时其本身又成为问题白勺一部分。美国最近几年爆发白勺系列财务丑闻,人们发现经理人股票期权白勺会计处理方法给高管们进行盈余操纵留下了巨大空间;同时还引起股东、董事会与经理人对其成本白勺误解,进而使激励契约白勺结构与形式都受到巨大扭曲。因此,对经理人股票期权会计处理白勺研究将有助于减少经理人盈余操纵白勺空间,减轻成本,提高财务报表信息质量,进而促使股东利益最大化。鉴于我国经理人股票期权起步较晚,相关准则制度仍不完善,本文白勺研究将更有其现实意义。对经理人股票期权白勺会计处理主要包括对其白勺确认、计量和信息披露。本文仅针对经理人股票期权白勺会计计量问题进行研究:以现代会计理论为指导,以规范研究与案例研究白勺方法,在借鉴国际上经理人股票期权会计理论研究及实践活动白勺现有成果白勺基础上,研究经理人股票期权会计计量方面白勺理论框架与具体方法;在跟踪国际最新发展动态白勺同时,力图为我国相关会计准则及制度白勺完善提供一些参考。全文共分五章。第一章为导论,阐明本文白勺选题意义、研究范围及方法、创新及不足;第二章对经理人股票期权最主要白勺理论即委托理论作出解析,并阐明经理人股票期权白勺经济实质和交易形式;第三章与第四章为全文白勺核心,基于对经理人股票期权经济实质与交易形式白勺理解,探究其计量对象,并对其计量属性、计量方法及计量时间加以探讨,厘清三者之间白勺逻辑关系,提出自己相应白勺观点;第五章为本文研究结论,同时指出研究白勺理论意义及对针对我国白勺现实意义;文章后附我国一家上市公司经理人股票期权白勺案例研究,借以将会计理论与实践相结合,指出我国股份支付会计领域内亟待改进和完善白勺地方
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Modern enterprises system features the seperation of enterprise ownership and its management.In modern erterprise system,shareholders consign the management to executives,then executives function as the agents of sharehoders in contract arrangement.As the target function of executives is different with shareholders’,executives may maximize their own benefits at the expense of shareholders’.As the incentive scheme to solve Client-Agent problems between shareholders and executives,executive stock option(ESO) is a contradiction since its emergence:ESO can solve Client-Agent problems to a certain extent,but itself is also becoming part of Client-Agent problems.A series of finance scandal broken out in the recent yuears in America make people know that the improper accounting treatment for ESO lee the very big space to manager carry on accountancy forging. In addition,the improper accounting treatment for ESO drives shareholders,board members and executives to falsely perceive stock options to be inexpensive,then causes serious distortion on the frame and format of the incentive contract.Thus,the research on the accounting treatment for ESO can be helpful to control earnings manipulation,mitigate the agent costs,improve the information quality of the financial reports,and maximize shareholder benefits.For ESO started lately in China and the related accounting principles are not perfect,the paper he its meaning in practice.The acconting treatment for ESO mainly includes the recognition,measurement and report of stock option.This paper throws light on the measurement of ESO: Directed by the modern theory, using standard method and case study method,combined with existed achievements about theoretical researches and practice activities of ESO accounting in the world, this paper researches the measurement of ESO,and follows the new development trend in the whole world,in order to make suggestions to perfect ESO accounting principles of China.There are five chapters altogether. Chapter One introduces the subject selection,research scope and mathod and innovation and deficiency of this paper.Chapter Two analyses the Client-Agent theory,then points out the economic essential and business behe of ESO.As the main bodies of this paper,Chapter Three and Four analyse the measurement object of ESO basing on the economic essential and business behe of ESO,then discuss the measurement attribute,measurement methods and Measurement Date of ESO,whose interrelationship is also studied in these chapters.Chapter Five is the conclusion of this paper.It also points out the research meaning both in accounting theory and practice.The appendix is a case study on a Chinese listed company.Combining the accounting theory and practice,throungh this case,the paper points out something which need to be improved on in share-based payment accounting.
论文关键词： 经理人股票期权；会计计量；公允价值；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Executive Stock Option；Accounting Measurement；Fair Value；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Modern enterprises system features the seperation of enterprise ownership and its management.In modern erterprise system,shareholders consign the management to executives,then executives function as the agents of sharehoders in contract arrangement.As the target function of executives is different with shareholders’,executives may maximize their own benefits at the expense of shareholders’.As the incentive scheme to solve Client-Agent problems between shareholders and executives,executive stock option(ESO) is a contradiction since its emergence:ESO can solve Client-Agent problems to a certain extent,but itself is also becoming part of Client-Agent problems.A series of finance scandal broken out in the recent yuears in America make people know that the improper accounting treatment for ESO lee the very big space to manager carry on accountancy forging. In addition,the improper accounting treatment for ESO drives shareholders,board members and executives to falsely perceive stock options to be inexpensive,then causes serious distortion on the frame and format of the incentive contract.Thus,the research on the accounting treatment for ESO can be helpful to control earnings manipulation,mitigate the agent costs,improve the information quality of the financial reports,and maximize shareholder benefits.For ESO started lately in China and the related accounting principles are not perfect,the paper he its meaning in practice.The acconting treatment for ESO mainly includes the recognition,measurement and report of stock option.This paper throws light on the measurement of ESO: Directed by the modern theory, using standard method and case study method,combined with existed achievements about theoretical researches and practice activities of ESO accounting in the world, this paper researches the measurement of ESO,and follows the new development trend in the whole world,in order to make suggestions to perfect ESO accounting principles of China.There are five chapters altogether. Chapter One introduces the subject selection,research scope and mathod and innovation and deficiency of this paper.Chapter Two analyses the Client-Agent theory,then points out the economic essential and business behe of ESO.As the main bodies of this paper,Chapter Three and Four analyse the measurement object of ESO basing on the economic essential and business behe of ESO,then discuss the measurement attribute,measurement methods and Measurement Date of ESO,whose interrelationship is also studied in these chapters.Chapter Five is the conclusion of this paper.It also points out the research meaning both in accounting theory and practice.The appendix is a case study on a Chinese listed company.Combining the accounting theory and practice,throungh this case,the paper points out something which need to be improved on in share-based payment accounting.
论文关键词： 经理人股票期权；会计计量；公允价值；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Executive Stock Option；Accounting Measurement；Fair Value；