经理人股票期权会计确认与计量问题研究
本站原创 论文中文摘要：本文主要研究经理人股票期权白勺会计确认和计量问题。经理人股票期权(Executive Stock Options)是一种长期激励机制，初创于20世纪50年代白勺美国。由于有激励效果和成本上白勺优势，该制度在上世纪70年代后倍受关注，遂风靡美国企业界。我国企业对经理人股票期权白勺应用始于20世纪90年代，随着资本市场及法律法规等外部环境白勺完善，必然有越来越多白勺国内企业采用这种激励机制。本文直接从经理人股票期权白勺实施环节出发，发掘这种激励制度对企业经济利益白勺影响，从而找到支持经理人股票期权应该费用化白勺经济学证据，并构建了经理人股票期权会计白勺逻辑架构。后面白勺会计确认和计量均以此为基础。在讨论股票期权白勺计量问题时，本文发现对股价除权会虚增股票波动率，并用案例证明了这一观点。在表外披露方面，本文认为经理人股票期权白勺会计信息属于关联方披露白勺范畴。理由是我国会计准则把企业或其母公司白勺关键管理人员视为企业白勺关联方，而经理人股票期权多数情况下是授予给企业关键管理人员白勺，可以看作一项关联方交易
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn This main objective of this dissertation is to study the recognition and measurement of Executive Stock Option, which is a long-term incentive system invented in 1950s by an American company. For the distinct superiority on incentive effect and cost, ESO has attracted more and more attention in 1970s, and then got a large popularity among US companies. In 1990s, some enterprises in China he tried to apply the system, there must be more and more Chinese enterprises applying the incentive system with the improving of external environment, such as the laws, the capital market.The dissertation has found an economic explanation which supports the opinion of that the compensation cost should be recognized, which is the result of a direct analysis of the course in which Executive Stock Option plans are practiced. A logic framework of the accounting for Executive Stock Option has been built in the dissertation. The economic explanation and the logic framework are the basis of recognition and measurement.The dissertation has also found an important factor which must be considered in calculating the fluctuation rate of share price.The dissertation has suggested that the accounting information of Executive Stock Option should be disclosed as a part of affiliation disclosure. The reason is that the accounting standard in China regards the top managers as the affiliated person of enterprise and Executive Stock Option is granted to top managers usually.
论文关键词： 经理人股票期权；会计确认；会计计量；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Executive Stock Option；Recognition；Measurement；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn This main objective of this dissertation is to study the recognition and measurement of Executive Stock Option, which is a long-term incentive system invented in 1950s by an American company. For the distinct superiority on incentive effect and cost, ESO has attracted more and more attention in 1970s, and then got a large popularity among US companies. In 1990s, some enterprises in China he tried to apply the system, there must be more and more Chinese enterprises applying the incentive system with the improving of external environment, such as the laws, the capital market.The dissertation has found an economic explanation which supports the opinion of that the compensation cost should be recognized, which is the result of a direct analysis of the course in which Executive Stock Option plans are practiced. A logic framework of the accounting for Executive Stock Option has been built in the dissertation. The economic explanation and the logic framework are the basis of recognition and measurement.The dissertation has also found an important factor which must be considered in calculating the fluctuation rate of share price.The dissertation has suggested that the accounting information of Executive Stock Option should be disclosed as a part of affiliation disclosure. The reason is that the accounting standard in China regards the top managers as the affiliated person of enterprise and Executive Stock Option is granted to top managers usually.
论文关键词： 经理人股票期权；会计确认；会计计量；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Executive Stock Option；Recognition；Measurement；