股权集中度、竞争与上市公司绩效
本站原创 论文中文摘要：国内外学者多以委托理论和产权理论为依据来研究股权集中度与公司绩效白勺关系,较少有人从超产权理论和竞争理论白勺角度来研究股权集中度与公司绩效白勺关系。本文正是结合超产权理论和竞争理论,从竞争白勺视角来研究股权集中度与公司绩效白勺关系。本文在已有研究白勺基础上选取沪、深两市15家电子行业和20家能源行业白勺8个年度白勺数据为样本,以上市公司白勺会计收益率为被解释变量,第一大股东所占股权比例为解释变量,引入公司规模、公司成长性和资产负债率为控制变量建立面板数据模型,分为竞争性强和竞争性弱两组分别对股权集中度与公司绩效之间白勺关系进行研究。研究白勺结果表明,无论是竞争激烈白勺电子行业还是竞争性弱白勺能源行业,股权集中度与公司绩效之间都呈现符合理论假设白勺倒“U”型关系。从行业竞争性白勺角度研究发现,由于不同竞争程度白勺环境对公司内部治理白勺作用不同,竞争程度强白勺电子行业白勺最优股权集中度要小于竞争程度弱白勺能源行业
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn The relationship between ownership concentration and company performance, as an important branch of the company governance issue, is widely studied home and abroad. Based on the principal-agent theory, property right theory, beyond property-right theory and competition theory, the dissertation inquires into such relationship in terms of sector classification from the competition perspective, as well as the empirical analysis of panel data model established.The dissertation consists of four parts:Chapter 1, the preface, gives a brief introduction of research background and significance with emphasis on the display of related bibliography both from China and overseas, by concluding which, the frame is brought forward.Chapter2 refers to such theories concerning ownership concentration, competition and performance. Principal-agent theory with reversed“U”model is firstly discussed. The theory maintains that concentrated ownership, by prohibiting such“hitchhikers”, can serve as effective supervision leading the managers to make decisions conformed to the interests of the company. However, excessively-high level of concentration may cause“Three Infringements”. Firstly, infringement of rights. Ostensibly, big shareholders surveille managers on behalf of massive all ones and afford such surveillance costs. They make contributions and sacrifices for the sake of the residual revenue belonging to all shareholders. Nevertheless, if all ones cannot supervise big ones effectively, then, the latter will violate the interests of the former by acting as their agent. Secondly, due to restrictions, it has brought negative effect on management innovation. Highly-concentrated shareholders will gather the power strong enough to intervene in the management affairs, which will frustrate the enthusia of the managers. Thirdly, stock liquidity will be brought down. Thus, a theoretical foundation is laid for dealing the issue, which can be describe in curve in the shape of a reversed“U”. Some basic and standard mathematical models followed are also provided. What is secondly studied in this chapter is the relationship among different theories respecting property, beyond property-right, competition development and company performance. The theoretical pattern of ownership, competition and performance is researched in the last part with the illustration that external competition influences performance by means of affecting the mechani of recruitment and financing. Competitive market can be compared to a magnifier: the fiercer competition is, by creating more profit, the higher stimulation to rally up the working drive of managers will be.Chapter 3, empirical analysis and suggestions. In the beginning of this chapter, two propositions are brought forward. The first one shows the issue in the shape of a reversed“U”. Were it tenable, the second one would hold that the location of the turning point in competitive sectors will be lower than in monopolistic ones. In other words, the concentration level of optimal stocks in competitive sectors will be lower than in monopolistic ones. In order to better explain them, models and graphs are used as well. In terms of empirical analysis, ownership concentration is measured by the holding proportion of the biggest shareholder with performance being valued by yield of net assets based on samples from 15 companies in electronic sector and 20 in energy sector listed in Shanghai & Shenzhen Stock Exchange Market. Then , some controllable variables regarding liability, assets and development are chosen to build up the panel data model, which can overcome heteroscedasticity, offer more information to reduce multicollinearity among regressed variables and enhance freedom degree so as to increase the efficiency of parameter estimate. Take these unique attributes of different companies within the same sector into consideration, such as company culture, charia & talent of leaders, which excludes the structural difference, the model of individual fixed effect is introduced. The empirical outcome falls in theoretical assumptions: in addition to the proved curve of reversed“U”, the optimal concentration level of stocks in sectors highly-competed is lower than in weaker ones. In the last part of the chapter, suggestions are made in combination with the current situation of company governance of China. 1. set an appropriate level of ownership concentration; 2. take full consideration of competing degree of varied markets; 3. introduce competition mechani; 4. properly use financial lever to improve the performance of companies listed; 5. enhance the efficiency of capital market.Chapter 4, limitations and furthering problems. Defects are inevitable in the process of sector & index targeting and financial dealing. As a complicated intersectant subject , company governance has various sources of theories with different researching perspectives. Based on the current situation of China, the dissertation points out the prospect of further studying regard.Conclusion comes to the last by way of both theoretical and empirical analysis:1.The relationship between ownership concentration and company performance is in the shape of a reversed“U”;2.The optimal concentration level of stocks in sectors highly-competed is lower than in weaker ones. External markets with competitive factors will impact the internal structure of company governance and stimulate the driving force of managers. Thus, compared with monopolistic sectors, highly-competitive ones can low down their concentration to a suitable level. As managers are surveilled, it can prevent big shareholders from violating the interests of all ones.3.The arrangement of optimal concentration level of stocks is subjected to the restrictions of law.
论文关键词： 股权集中度；最优股权集中度；竞争；公司绩效；面板数据模型；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn The relationship between ownership concentration and company performance, as an important branch of the company governance issue, is widely studied home and abroad. Based on the principal-agent theory, property right theory, beyond property-right theory and competition theory, the dissertation inquires into such relationship in terms of sector classification from the competition perspective, as well as the empirical analysis of panel data model established.The dissertation consists of four parts:Chapter 1, the preface, gives a brief introduction of research background and significance with emphasis on the display of related bibliography both from China and overseas, by concluding which, the frame is brought forward.Chapter2 refers to such theories concerning ownership concentration, competition and performance. Principal-agent theory with reversed“U”model is firstly discussed. The theory maintains that concentrated ownership, by prohibiting such“hitchhikers”, can serve as effective supervision leading the managers to make decisions conformed to the interests of the company. However, excessively-high level of concentration may cause“Three Infringements”. Firstly, infringement of rights. Ostensibly, big shareholders surveille managers on behalf of massive all ones and afford such surveillance costs. They make contributions and sacrifices for the sake of the residual revenue belonging to all shareholders. Nevertheless, if all ones cannot supervise big ones effectively, then, the latter will violate the interests of the former by acting as their agent. Secondly, due to restrictions, it has brought negative effect on management innovation. Highly-concentrated shareholders will gather the power strong enough to intervene in the management affairs, which will frustrate the enthusia of the managers. Thirdly, stock liquidity will be brought down. Thus, a theoretical foundation is laid for dealing the issue, which can be describe in curve in the shape of a reversed“U”. Some basic and standard mathematical models followed are also provided. What is secondly studied in this chapter is the relationship among different theories respecting property, beyond property-right, competition development and company performance. The theoretical pattern of ownership, competition and performance is researched in the last part with the illustration that external competition influences performance by means of affecting the mechani of recruitment and financing. Competitive market can be compared to a magnifier: the fiercer competition is, by creating more profit, the higher stimulation to rally up the working drive of managers will be.Chapter 3, empirical analysis and suggestions. In the beginning of this chapter, two propositions are brought forward. The first one shows the issue in the shape of a reversed“U”. Were it tenable, the second one would hold that the location of the turning point in competitive sectors will be lower than in monopolistic ones. In other words, the concentration level of optimal stocks in competitive sectors will be lower than in monopolistic ones. In order to better explain them, models and graphs are used as well. In terms of empirical analysis, ownership concentration is measured by the holding proportion of the biggest shareholder with performance being valued by yield of net assets based on samples from 15 companies in electronic sector and 20 in energy sector listed in Shanghai & Shenzhen Stock Exchange Market. Then , some controllable variables regarding liability, assets and development are chosen to build up the panel data model, which can overcome heteroscedasticity, offer more information to reduce multicollinearity among regressed variables and enhance freedom degree so as to increase the efficiency of parameter estimate. Take these unique attributes of different companies within the same sector into consideration, such as company culture, charia & talent of leaders, which excludes the structural difference, the model of individual fixed effect is introduced. The empirical outcome falls in theoretical assumptions: in addition to the proved curve of reversed“U”, the optimal concentration level of stocks in sectors highly-competed is lower than in weaker ones. In the last part of the chapter, suggestions are made in combination with the current situation of company governance of China. 1. set an appropriate level of ownership concentration; 2. take full consideration of competing degree of varied markets; 3. introduce competition mechani; 4. properly use financial lever to improve the performance of companies listed; 5. enhance the efficiency of capital market.Chapter 4, limitations and furthering problems. Defects are inevitable in the process of sector & index targeting and financial dealing. As a complicated intersectant subject , company governance has various sources of theories with different researching perspectives. Based on the current situation of China, the dissertation points out the prospect of further studying regard.Conclusion comes to the last by way of both theoretical and empirical analysis:1.The relationship between ownership concentration and company performance is in the shape of a reversed“U”;2.The optimal concentration level of stocks in sectors highly-competed is lower than in weaker ones. External markets with competitive factors will impact the internal structure of company governance and stimulate the driving force of managers. Thus, compared with monopolistic sectors, highly-competitive ones can low down their concentration to a suitable level. As managers are surveilled, it can prevent big shareholders from violating the interests of all ones.3.The arrangement of optimal concentration level of stocks is subjected to the restrictions of law.
论文关键词： 股权集中度；最优股权集中度；竞争；公司绩效；面板数据模型；