公司治理对盈余管理影响实证分析
本站原创 论文中文摘要：所有权和经营权分离是现代公司制企业白勺显著特征。在两权分离下,内部控制白勺薄弱和公司治理白勺缺陷导致了盈余管理白勺发生。上市公司作为公司制企业中白勺佼佼者,也普遍存在着盈余管理行为,严重影响了会计信息披露质量。所以有必要对盈余管理白勺制约因素进行实证分析。从制度上讲,盈余管理白勺抑制因素包括会计制度和公司治理。会计制度是较稳定白勺,而且会计制度抑制盈余管理白勺作用白勺发挥依赖于公司白勺治理体系,因此,完善公司治理体系是抑制盈余管理、提高会计信息披露质量白勺重要途径。本文主要研究我国上市公司白勺公司治理对盈余管理影响,以检验上市公司公司治理抑制盈余管理白勺有效性是否得到充分发挥。本文采用规范和实证相结合白勺研究方法。首先回顾国内外盈余管理和公司治理白勺相关文献,通过规范性分析提出公司治理各特征变量对盈余管理影响白勺研究假设,然后以2008年沪深两市白勺A股上市公司为研究对象进行实证分析,对研究假设进行检验,得出实证结果:我国上市公司控股股东持股比例、高管年薪和监事会规模与盈余管理显著正相关。董事人数、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、高管持股与盈余管理负相关,但是相关性不显著
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn In these years, the listed companies’financial scandals were broken out all over the world, such as Enron, WorldCom, Lantian, Zhengbaiwen and other financial frauds. Quality of information disclosure of listed companies were drawn more and more attention. Earnings management, as the primary means to Manipulate of earnings and provide false financial information, has become a hot spot both theoretically and practically. To some extent, earnings management increasing agency costs between the owners and operators, has seriously affected the quality of accounting information and has harmed the interests of investors. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies and to maintain the normal order of the capital market, it is necessary to do empirical research on the constraints of earnings management. From the institutional perspective, the constraints of earnings management include the accounting system and corporate governance. Accounting system is rigid and more stable, usually remains the same during a long time. In addition, Accounting system playing the role of inhibiting earnings management depends on the company’s regular internal controls and the sound corporate governance system. Therefore, the establishment of sound corporate governance system is an important way to constrain earnings management and improve the quality of accounting information. Domestic companies’corporate governance transplants from Western countries. According to the foreign related research, foreign companies’corporate governance system plays an important role in ensuring the ooth operation of internal control and constraining earnings management, which has enhanced the Quality of accounting information, According to the domestic related research, whether corporate governance of listed companies has played some role at this stage, has yet to practice. Separation of ownership and operating rights is a significant feature of corporate enterprise, it produces agent cost and asymmetric information between the owners and operators. Earnings management and corporate governance are both based on the principal agent problem. The research of earnings management belongs to accounting research areas, which mainly disclose the intervention of generation process of the financial report. Corporate governance is a relatively complex concept, also belongs to economics, finance, accounting and other research areas. Corporate governance, simply, is a series of institutional arrangements and mechanis to regulate the rights, responsibilities and benefits of related parties. Corporate governance includes external and internal corporate governance. External governance mainly includes product markets, managers markets and capital markets. External corporate governance is under the precondition of efficient capital markets. In view of the domestic capital market invalid , It is internal corporate governance play the main role in improving the quality of accounting information. This paper mainly researches the impact of internal corporate governance of listed companies on earnings management, in order to test whether the internal corporate governance of listed companies plays fully effectively.The thesis adopts academic and experimental ways. The main part of the paper consist of Chapter Two, Chapter Three, Chapter Four. In Chapter Two, the thesis first reviews the related domestic and foreign literature of earnings management and corporate governance, from many perspectives, analysing the causes of earnings management and corporate governance. Then to make the system summarized on the motivation of earnings management. Finally, to analyse the impact of the internal corporate governance on earnings management. From four respects of the ownership structure, board characteristics, characteristics of the board of supervisors, managers, the thesis put forward the hypothesis of this paper: the relationship between the proportion of the largest shareholder and earnings management is positive; the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management are positive; the number of directors and earnings management are negatively correlated; the proportion of independent directors and earnings management are negatively correlated; The number of board of Supervisors’meetings and earnings management are negatively correlated; the relationship between executive ownership and earnings management is negative . Chapter There is the design of the research. This part first defines that the research method is academic and experimental. Then the measurement method and measurement model of earnings management that are adopted in this paper are defined. Because earnings management can not be observed directly, which need to use a certain method, and to take a specific measurement model to measure up. The measurement methods and measurement model of earnings management he a direct impact on the results of empirical research, so this paper summarizes and weigh the measurement methods and measurement model of earnings management. Based on the previous academic research, there are mainly three types of measurement methods of earnings management: the method of total profit accrued, the method of specific profit accrued, the method of detecting distribution of earnings management, in which the method of total profit accrued is most appropriate for this thesis. With regard to the total accruals method, the non-discretionary accruals profits can be measured, the difference between the two is the part of accruals which in control, which is substitution variable of earnings management. The total accruals method includes eight specific models: Healy Model(1985), DeAngelo Model(1994), Jones Model(1991),Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995), Industry Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995), Section Jones Model (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), Section &Modified Jones Model (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), Expanding Jones Model (Lujianqiao, 1999). According to our current capital market and the demand of this thesis, Section & Expanding Jones Model is adopted. Finally, this Chapter describes the scope of research sample , A-share listed companies of Chinese stocks market including Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2008, removing that does not meet the requirements, following the part of the empirical analysis. There are two linear regressions in Chapter Four. The first linear regression is to put the data of sample into Section & Expanding Jones Model, to count the earnings management variable. The second linear regression is to test the effect of the internal corporate governance variables on earnings management, the results show that: the proportion of the largest shareholder and earnings management is a significant positive correlated; executive compensation and earnings management is a significant positive correlated; the size of Board of Supervisors and earnings management is a significant positive correlated; directors and earnings management is negative correlated, but the correlation is not significant; proportion of independent directors and earnings management is weak negative correlated; the number of Board of Supervisors’meetings and earnings management is negatively correlated, but the correlation does not reach the significance level; executive ownership and earnings management is also weak negative correlated. The thesis draws some conclusions: the effect of corporate governance of listed companies on earnings management has yet played fully effectively, corporate governance of domestic listed companies is in the gradually improved stage. Finally, the thesis puts forward some relevant recommendations.
论文关键词： 上市公司；盈余管理；公司治理；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn listed companies；earnings management；corporate governance；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn In these years, the listed companies’financial scandals were broken out all over the world, such as Enron, WorldCom, Lantian, Zhengbaiwen and other financial frauds. Quality of information disclosure of listed companies were drawn more and more attention. Earnings management, as the primary means to Manipulate of earnings and provide false financial information, has become a hot spot both theoretically and practically. To some extent, earnings management increasing agency costs between the owners and operators, has seriously affected the quality of accounting information and has harmed the interests of investors. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies and to maintain the normal order of the capital market, it is necessary to do empirical research on the constraints of earnings management. From the institutional perspective, the constraints of earnings management include the accounting system and corporate governance. Accounting system is rigid and more stable, usually remains the same during a long time. In addition, Accounting system playing the role of inhibiting earnings management depends on the company’s regular internal controls and the sound corporate governance system. Therefore, the establishment of sound corporate governance system is an important way to constrain earnings management and improve the quality of accounting information. Domestic companies’corporate governance transplants from Western countries. According to the foreign related research, foreign companies’corporate governance system plays an important role in ensuring the ooth operation of internal control and constraining earnings management, which has enhanced the Quality of accounting information, According to the domestic related research, whether corporate governance of listed companies has played some role at this stage, has yet to practice. Separation of ownership and operating rights is a significant feature of corporate enterprise, it produces agent cost and asymmetric information between the owners and operators. Earnings management and corporate governance are both based on the principal agent problem. The research of earnings management belongs to accounting research areas, which mainly disclose the intervention of generation process of the financial report. Corporate governance is a relatively complex concept, also belongs to economics, finance, accounting and other research areas. Corporate governance, simply, is a series of institutional arrangements and mechanis to regulate the rights, responsibilities and benefits of related parties. Corporate governance includes external and internal corporate governance. External governance mainly includes product markets, managers markets and capital markets. External corporate governance is under the precondition of efficient capital markets. In view of the domestic capital market invalid , It is internal corporate governance play the main role in improving the quality of accounting information. This paper mainly researches the impact of internal corporate governance of listed companies on earnings management, in order to test whether the internal corporate governance of listed companies plays fully effectively.The thesis adopts academic and experimental ways. The main part of the paper consist of Chapter Two, Chapter Three, Chapter Four. In Chapter Two, the thesis first reviews the related domestic and foreign literature of earnings management and corporate governance, from many perspectives, analysing the causes of earnings management and corporate governance. Then to make the system summarized on the motivation of earnings management. Finally, to analyse the impact of the internal corporate governance on earnings management. From four respects of the ownership structure, board characteristics, characteristics of the board of supervisors, managers, the thesis put forward the hypothesis of this paper: the relationship between the proportion of the largest shareholder and earnings management is positive; the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management are positive; the number of directors and earnings management are negatively correlated; the proportion of independent directors and earnings management are negatively correlated; The number of board of Supervisors’meetings and earnings management are negatively correlated; the relationship between executive ownership and earnings management is negative . Chapter There is the design of the research. This part first defines that the research method is academic and experimental. Then the measurement method and measurement model of earnings management that are adopted in this paper are defined. Because earnings management can not be observed directly, which need to use a certain method, and to take a specific measurement model to measure up. The measurement methods and measurement model of earnings management he a direct impact on the results of empirical research, so this paper summarizes and weigh the measurement methods and measurement model of earnings management. Based on the previous academic research, there are mainly three types of measurement methods of earnings management: the method of total profit accrued, the method of specific profit accrued, the method of detecting distribution of earnings management, in which the method of total profit accrued is most appropriate for this thesis. With regard to the total accruals method, the non-discretionary accruals profits can be measured, the difference between the two is the part of accruals which in control, which is substitution variable of earnings management. The total accruals method includes eight specific models: Healy Model(1985), DeAngelo Model(1994), Jones Model(1991),Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995), Industry Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995), Section Jones Model (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), Section &Modified Jones Model (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), Expanding Jones Model (Lujianqiao, 1999). According to our current capital market and the demand of this thesis, Section & Expanding Jones Model is adopted. Finally, this Chapter describes the scope of research sample , A-share listed companies of Chinese stocks market including Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2008, removing that does not meet the requirements, following the part of the empirical analysis. There are two linear regressions in Chapter Four. The first linear regression is to put the data of sample into Section & Expanding Jones Model, to count the earnings management variable. The second linear regression is to test the effect of the internal corporate governance variables on earnings management, the results show that: the proportion of the largest shareholder and earnings management is a significant positive correlated; executive compensation and earnings management is a significant positive correlated; the size of Board of Supervisors and earnings management is a significant positive correlated; directors and earnings management is negative correlated, but the correlation is not significant; proportion of independent directors and earnings management is weak negative correlated; the number of Board of Supervisors’meetings and earnings management is negatively correlated, but the correlation does not reach the significance level; executive ownership and earnings management is also weak negative correlated. The thesis draws some conclusions: the effect of corporate governance of listed companies on earnings management has yet played fully effectively, corporate governance of domestic listed companies is in the gradually improved stage. Finally, the thesis puts forward some relevant recommendations.
论文关键词： 上市公司；盈余管理；公司治理；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn listed companies；earnings management；corporate governance；