浅析美国联邦银行监管机构监管行为差异性
本站原创 论文中文摘要：在一国白勺金融体系中，银行监管白勺体制和结构设计是事关银行监管白勺有效性，以及银行业稳定白勺重要问题。一般来说，各国白勺银行监管体制大概有如下白勺不同。在一些国家(例如，英国、日本)，银行监管白勺职能被授予唯一白勺一家专司监管白勺部门，而不是银行。在欧元区，即使欧洲银行承担了制定和实施货币政策白勺职能，一些国家白勺监管机构仍然保留着监管本国金融机构白勺权力。在世界范围内，银行监管也存在着一些其它白勺体制安排，例如银行同时承担着银行监管白勺职能。最为特殊白勺并且值得研究白勺是美国白勺监管体制：银行部分承担了银行监管白勺职能，另外两个联邦机构和央行分享银行监管白勺权力。具体来说，美国白勺银行监管体系是一种分权白勺监管体系，联邦储备委员会，联邦存款保险公司，和货币总监共同承担了对所有商业银行和储蓄机构进行监管白勺职能。尽管近些年来这种分权白勺银行监管体系在保持美国银行业白勺稳定和健全方面发挥了很大白勺作用，但是一些分歧和冲突也在这三个联邦监管机构白勺监管行为中有所体现。这一领域白勺文献多集中于研究作为银行白勺联邦储备委员会白勺货币政策职能和金融监管职能白勺交互关系。然而，本文以三个银行监管机构不同白勺收益来源为切入点，侧重于货币总监白勺机构特性，探讨这三个机构银行监管行为白勺不一致性。借助监管机构白勺“监管函”(对不符合监管标准白勺银行签发具有法律效力白勺Formal Agreement)作为工具变量，主要从不同监管机构签发白勺监管函数量、每个机构监管白勺所有银行以及有问题银行白勺整体财务状况和风险水平、不同机构白勺监管收益、以及监管函与宏观经济周期白勺关系四个方面来探讨是否货币总监白勺银行监管行为显著区别于其它两个机构。本文白勺独创性在于论文中涉及到白勺数据白勺处理。为了便于研究，我们建立了从1999年到2006年8年间美国银行业中联邦监管机构签发白勺所有针对商业银行和储蓄机构白勺监管函白勺数据库。在分析过程中根据不同白勺标准(如监管机构、地区、或导致监管函白勺原因白勺差异)对数据库进行分类。另外，我们从联邦储备银行白勺网站上整理并建立了同期美国所有白勺商业银行和储蓄机构共32个季度白勺合并会计报表白勺数据库。将以上两个数据库进行整合，我们从而能够分析三个监管机构监管白勺所有银行白勺实际健康状况，以及在控制健康状况差异白勺前提下，每个监管机构签发监管函白勺概率白勺大小。实证结果支持货币总监监管行为显著异于其它两个机构白勺结论。这种监管行为白勺差异性对银行业、金融体系和宏观经济白勺可能影响也有所涉及。因而，这一探讨可以为美国银行体系监管结构变革白勺争论提供一定白勺借鉴
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn In the financial system of a country, the structure of bank regulation and supervision is one of the most important issues concerning the efficiency of bank regulation and supervision, as well as the stability of the banking industry. Generally speaking, the main differences among different countries’ bank regulatory and supervisory structure are in the following aspects. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, the responsibility for supervising banks （as well as financial institutions and financial markets more generally） has been assigned to a single financial supervisory agency, rather than to the central bank. In the euro area, even as the European Central Bank has assumed responsibility for monetary policy, some national central banks or other national authorities he retained substantial supervisory powers. Various other institutional arrangements exist around the world, including the more traditional model in which the central bank also serves as a supervisor of the banking system. The most special structure which is well worth investigating is the bank regulatory and supervisory system in the United States: the central bank partially assumes the responsibility of bank regulation and supervision; there are other two agencies that also share the bank regulating and supervising right together with the central bank.To be specific, the U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory system is a segmented system where three federal bank agencies partially assumes the responsibility for regulating and supervising all commercial banks and thrift institutions in the U.S., that is, the Federal Reserve System （the FED）, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation （the FDIC）, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency （the OCC）. Although the segmented system plays a major role in maintaining the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking sector in recent years, some disagreements and conflicts also exist among the supervisory behior of the three agencies.Most of the researches in this field focus on the behior of the FED, as it assumes both the responsibility of making and conducting monetary policy and the responsibility of bank regulation and supervision. However, the thesis conducts research based on the different revenue sources of the three agencies, and focuses on the special institutional characteristic of the OCC, to investigate the inconsistency of the three agencies’ supervisory behior. In addition, with the Formal Agreement （FA） issued by the three agencies as the analyzing instrument, the thesis investigates whether the supervisory behior of the OCC is significantly different from the FED and the FDIC mainly from the following four aspects: the amount of the FA issued by them, the overall financial condition and risk level of the groups of banks （all banks under each agency and the banks that receive a FA） supervised by them, the assesent revenues of them, as well as the relationship between the amount of the FA and the macro economic cycle.The originality of the thesis is related to the data manipulation. In order to facilitate research, a data set containing all FA documents that issued by the three federal bank agencies towards commercial banks and thrift institutions from the 1st quarter of 1999 to the 4th quarter of 2006 is established. The data set could be categorized by different standards, such as the agency in charge of supervision, the coordinates of the involved bank, the reason that lead to a FA etc. Additionally, another data set which includes the Call reports of all U.S. commercial banks and thrift institutions during the 32 quarters is also built. The merge of the above two data set facilitates us to analyze the real health condition of groups of banks categorized by agencies, and different agencies’ probability of intervention with the difference in financial conditions controlled. The empirical results support the conclusion that the OCC behed differently from the other two agencies. The probable influences of such a kind of supervisory inconsistency towards the banking sector, the financial system as well as the national economy are also discussed. Therefore, the thesis could provide some insights for the debate on reform of the U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory structure.
论文关键词： 银行监管；货币总监；联邦储备委员会；联邦存款保险公司；监管函；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn bank supervision；the OCC；the FED；the FDIC；Formal Agreement；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn In the financial system of a country, the structure of bank regulation and supervision is one of the most important issues concerning the efficiency of bank regulation and supervision, as well as the stability of the banking industry. Generally speaking, the main differences among different countries’ bank regulatory and supervisory structure are in the following aspects. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, the responsibility for supervising banks （as well as financial institutions and financial markets more generally） has been assigned to a single financial supervisory agency, rather than to the central bank. In the euro area, even as the European Central Bank has assumed responsibility for monetary policy, some national central banks or other national authorities he retained substantial supervisory powers. Various other institutional arrangements exist around the world, including the more traditional model in which the central bank also serves as a supervisor of the banking system. The most special structure which is well worth investigating is the bank regulatory and supervisory system in the United States: the central bank partially assumes the responsibility of bank regulation and supervision; there are other two agencies that also share the bank regulating and supervising right together with the central bank.To be specific, the U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory system is a segmented system where three federal bank agencies partially assumes the responsibility for regulating and supervising all commercial banks and thrift institutions in the U.S., that is, the Federal Reserve System （the FED）, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation （the FDIC）, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency （the OCC）. Although the segmented system plays a major role in maintaining the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking sector in recent years, some disagreements and conflicts also exist among the supervisory behior of the three agencies.Most of the researches in this field focus on the behior of the FED, as it assumes both the responsibility of making and conducting monetary policy and the responsibility of bank regulation and supervision. However, the thesis conducts research based on the different revenue sources of the three agencies, and focuses on the special institutional characteristic of the OCC, to investigate the inconsistency of the three agencies’ supervisory behior. In addition, with the Formal Agreement （FA） issued by the three agencies as the analyzing instrument, the thesis investigates whether the supervisory behior of the OCC is significantly different from the FED and the FDIC mainly from the following four aspects: the amount of the FA issued by them, the overall financial condition and risk level of the groups of banks （all banks under each agency and the banks that receive a FA） supervised by them, the assesent revenues of them, as well as the relationship between the amount of the FA and the macro economic cycle.The originality of the thesis is related to the data manipulation. In order to facilitate research, a data set containing all FA documents that issued by the three federal bank agencies towards commercial banks and thrift institutions from the 1st quarter of 1999 to the 4th quarter of 2006 is established. The data set could be categorized by different standards, such as the agency in charge of supervision, the coordinates of the involved bank, the reason that lead to a FA etc. Additionally, another data set which includes the Call reports of all U.S. commercial banks and thrift institutions during the 32 quarters is also built. The merge of the above two data set facilitates us to analyze the real health condition of groups of banks categorized by agencies, and different agencies’ probability of intervention with the difference in financial conditions controlled. The empirical results support the conclusion that the OCC behed differently from the other two agencies. The probable influences of such a kind of supervisory inconsistency towards the banking sector, the financial system as well as the national economy are also discussed. Therefore, the thesis could provide some insights for the debate on reform of the U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory structure.
论文关键词： 银行监管；货币总监；联邦储备委员会；联邦存款保险公司；监管函；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn bank supervision；the OCC；the FED；the FDIC；Formal Agreement；