上市公司总经理薪酬与会计盈余持续性关系实证研究
本站原创 论文中文摘要：国外白勺学者发现,以利润作为经理业绩评价基础,管理者会有意提升当期业绩以实现个人利益白勺最大化,偏离了通过让管理者分享剩余收益从而降低成本白勺最初目标。他们进一步研究发现,在制定管理者薪酬时,若重视盈余质量,并据此调整薪酬水平,则可以降低管理者白勺道德风险。本文以我国上市公司为研究对象,按照控股股东白勺性质进行分类,分别检验薪酬与盈余持续性白勺关系,并进一步分析即将退休白勺总经理白勺薪酬是否更重视盈余白勺持续性。本文发现,总经理年龄在59岁及以上白勺国有控股公司,薪酬只与市场收益和会计利润相关,盈余质量越差,与市场收益相关性越低;总经理年龄未到59岁白勺国有控股公司,薪酬与市场收益、会计利润、经营流量都相关,但未考虑盈余持续性;非国有控股公司总经理薪酬与经营流量有较弱白勺相关性,但盈余质量越差,这种相关性越强;总经理权益收益都只与市场收益相关,盈余持续性对其影响不大。基于上述结论,本文建议应加快改善国有控股公司白勺公司治理结构、增强非国有控股上市公司白勺激励机制,从而使总经理薪酬机制更为合理
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Manager’s compensation is the topic talking about by investor and scholars. In the last few years, many companies changed the mechani in order to improve the outputs and reduce the agent cost. Overseas scholars found that manager may run up the performance to maximize his own benefit if the company chooses income to design the compensation of manager, then this will not reduced the agent cost through letting the manager owns the residual ownership. Further research found the moral hazard can be reduced if the committees pay attention to the quality of the income and adjust the compensation hereby.In this dissertation, we choose the listed companies as the sample to investigate the relationship between manager’s compensation and earning persistence. Because the government control company’s government mechani is different from other companies, I divided the sample into two more all samples by the nature of the holding company to study the relationship between manager’s compensation and earning persistence separately. In this paper, I define there types compensation: cash compensation, compensation based on equity and total compensation in order to test whether the effect will be different if the structure of compensation is different. But cash compensation is more important in this paper. Further we will test weather the manager’s compensation will more relay on the earning persistence if the manager will retire.The empirical results reveal that both the natural of the nature of the holding company and the age of the manager affect the relationship between manager’s compensation and earning persistence. We found the cash compensation notable relationship between stock return and accounting income if the manager of the government control company is 59 old or older, the quality more tinpot the lower relativity between cash compensation and stock return; other manager’s cash compensation is correlative to stock return accounting income and cash flow of operation, but the relation between the cash compensation and earning persistence is not notable; In the company which not controlled by government the compensation is related to the cash flow of operation, but not very notable, then the income quality more tinpot the relativity more notable. In both samples the compensation based equity is only relative to stock return. Moreover the control variable firm size is not relative to cash compensation but relative to the compensation based on equity, the larger the company is the more stock the manager own.In the sample of government controlled company and the age of manager older than 59, the result of the relationship between compensation and earning persistence adverse to the suppose. It show that manage who is will retired can control his own compensation to maximize his benefits. The manage will not retired, earning persistence is not considered in designing the compensation. In the other sample, earning persistence is relative to manager’s compensation, but it is not affected by the age of the manager.Based this result we suggest that we should improve the corporate governance of the government controlled company, the company should distinguish the earning quality, if lots earning will not contain to the last year, and the compensation should relative to the outstanding achievement which is not controlled by manager. Moreover the incentive mechani should be build up in the company not controlled by government to improve the compensation mechani.There also some limitations in this dissertation:The model is designed simply in line; both the tradeoff between compensation and risk and the tradeoff between compensation and supervise are not considered. This issue should be covered in further research.
论文关键词： 总经理薪酬；公司业绩；会计盈余持续性；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Manager’s compensation is the topic talking about by investor and scholars. In the last few years, many companies changed the mechani in order to improve the outputs and reduce the agent cost. Overseas scholars found that manager may run up the performance to maximize his own benefit if the company chooses income to design the compensation of manager, then this will not reduced the agent cost through letting the manager owns the residual ownership. Further research found the moral hazard can be reduced if the committees pay attention to the quality of the income and adjust the compensation hereby.In this dissertation, we choose the listed companies as the sample to investigate the relationship between manager’s compensation and earning persistence. Because the government control company’s government mechani is different from other companies, I divided the sample into two more all samples by the nature of the holding company to study the relationship between manager’s compensation and earning persistence separately. In this paper, I define there types compensation: cash compensation, compensation based on equity and total compensation in order to test whether the effect will be different if the structure of compensation is different. But cash compensation is more important in this paper. Further we will test weather the manager’s compensation will more relay on the earning persistence if the manager will retire.The empirical results reveal that both the natural of the nature of the holding company and the age of the manager affect the relationship between manager’s compensation and earning persistence. We found the cash compensation notable relationship between stock return and accounting income if the manager of the government control company is 59 old or older, the quality more tinpot the lower relativity between cash compensation and stock return; other manager’s cash compensation is correlative to stock return accounting income and cash flow of operation, but the relation between the cash compensation and earning persistence is not notable; In the company which not controlled by government the compensation is related to the cash flow of operation, but not very notable, then the income quality more tinpot the relativity more notable. In both samples the compensation based equity is only relative to stock return. Moreover the control variable firm size is not relative to cash compensation but relative to the compensation based on equity, the larger the company is the more stock the manager own.In the sample of government controlled company and the age of manager older than 59, the result of the relationship between compensation and earning persistence adverse to the suppose. It show that manage who is will retired can control his own compensation to maximize his benefits. The manage will not retired, earning persistence is not considered in designing the compensation. In the other sample, earning persistence is relative to manager’s compensation, but it is not affected by the age of the manager.Based this result we suggest that we should improve the corporate governance of the government controlled company, the company should distinguish the earning quality, if lots earning will not contain to the last year, and the compensation should relative to the outstanding achievement which is not controlled by manager. Moreover the incentive mechani should be build up in the company not controlled by government to improve the compensation mechani.There also some limitations in this dissertation:The model is designed simply in line; both the tradeoff between compensation and risk and the tradeoff between compensation and supervise are not considered. This issue should be covered in further research.
论文关键词： 总经理薪酬；公司业绩；会计盈余持续性；