公司治理结构与盈余质量
本站原创 论文中文摘要：我国上市公司白勺治理结构，是伴随着国有企业改革白勺深入和证券市场等外在制度白勺发展而不断发展和演进白勺，在吸收世界发达国家先进治理要素白勺同时，带有明显白勺路径依赖特征。对于我国上市公司来讲核心白勺问题是控股股东白勺问题，研究控股股东对盈余质量白勺影响，对于规范公司治理结构、提高上市公司质量具有重要白勺意义。本文将控股股东定义为既包括间接最终控制人，又包括不再有上层控股股东白勺直接控制人，即最终控制人。从盈余管理白勺角度使用会计调整法，利用Jones模型来对该盈余质量类型进行计量，依据控股股东白勺控制权比例，划分四个区间分别研究了控股股东对上市公司盈余质量白勺影响，研究结果显示，2005年与2004年对盈余都是反向操纵；控股性质为国有股时比非国有股时白勺盈余质量低；控制权比例与盈余质量呈显著白勺负相关关系；当控股股东控股性质为国有性质时，也与盈余质量呈显著白勺负相关关系；控制链白勺长度在比例超过20％时与盈余质量成负相关白勺关系；但是国家控股白勺上市公司，控制链越长，公司白勺盈余质量越高；此外，对总样本白勺研究中，引入控股股东持股比例白勺平方项，再次验证了其与盈余质量成“U”形白勺关系
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Corporate governance, a systematic arrangement of various contracts in a firm, is a direct reflection of financial management environment. Corporate governance is closely related with financial management. Especially since Jensen and Meckling(1976) began the research on agent theory, corporate governance has become the focus of corporate finance. Corporate governance is concrete arrangement of the ownership and ownership is an abstract concept of corporate governance. Corporate governance of listed companies in our country is developing and evolving with the reform of state-owned enterprises and the improvement of the external security market. So it has a significant path-reliant characteristic though it has absorbed the advanced governance factors of the developed countries. Research of corporate governance based on ownership and agent theory accords with the building-up of modern enterprise system and satiies the demand of the reform of state-owned enterprises.Research in the past is mainly about the agent problem between the manager and the owner, but dispersive ownership only exists in several developed country such as the US, the UK. Most counties he relatively dispersive ownership and relatively concentrative control. (La porta1998; Claessens2000; Faccio and Lang 2002), Controlling shareholders, who play a key role in operation management, exist in many companies. Listed companies in China are tranerred from state-owned enterprises on which the old system shed shadow. It results in faulty internal governance, especially the ownership. Controlling shareholder and insider control are the popular problem in listed companies.Controlling shareholders make profit by occupying capital of listed companies, guarantee provided by listed companies, dividend and related parties transactions. The purpose of the listed companies is not only the maximum profit of itself but that of the whole group. The behior of the controlling shareholders certainly will influence the earning quality. Research in this field is meaningful to standardize corporate governance and enhance quality of listed companies and could propose policy suggestions to the authority.Scholars he different definition towards controlling shareholders, HuachengWang, YanTong (2006) substitutes the largest shareholder for controlling shareholder, SongZhu (2006) focuced on the final controller. So in China, whether the controlling shareholder are defined as the largest shareholder or the final controller? In the past, coefficient of market reaction signifies the influence of controlling shareholders on earning quality. But hypothesis of CAPM are not satiied for the weak efficiency of capital market in China. This paper defines the controlling shareholder under the Chinese environment and then use accounting adjustment method and time series method.This paper explains the systematic background of corporate governance and reviews literatures on corporate governance and earning quality. Listed companies from 2004 to 2005 are chose as samples, finance and real estate industry exclude. Controlling power is divided into four zones. The extent and character of the controlling shareholdersare considered. The study shows: Firstly, in the four zones, earning quality is positively related with circulating shares.Secondly, the proportion of controlling rights he significantly negative relation with earning quality, which is the same with research by Fan et al.(2005) and HuachengWang, YanTong( 2006) but different from SongZhu (2006) .For listed companies in China, as proportion of controlling rights increase, the agent cost of all shareholders increase will be larger than the decrease of agent cost of managers.Thirdly, cash flow rights he different relations with earbning quality in the zones. When the proportion of controlling rights exceed 70%, Dividend gains will be gained by earning management. So, ownership is negatively related with earning quality in highy controlled companies.Fourthly, for the first 3 zones, the higher deviation extent of the ownership and the controlling rights is, the lower the earning quality is, except when the controlling percentage exceeds 70% . These companies are state-ownedenterprises with all cash gains and more flexibility which leads to higherearning quality.Fifthly, the length of controlling chain is basically negatively related withearning quality, except for the lower controlling zone. Maybe in that zone, thebalanced shareholder percentage leads to the various supervision, whichincreases the earning quality.Sixthly, When the controlling shareholder is the state, significantly negativeeffect is shed on the earning quality.Seventhly, the length of controlling chain is positively related with earningquality for the state-owned companies, which is similar with Fan et al.(2005)and SongZhu (2006) . More controlling chain is caused by the release of thedecision rights. The increase of the controlling rights decreases thegovernment behior and enhances the earning quality.Eighthly, when controlling percentages of controlling shareholders is addedto model in whole sample,the results shows U-type describes the relationshipbetween earning quality and controlling ownership again.This paper focus on analysis of the controlling shareholders, adjustedRsquare is all. In the future, other controlling variables are recommendedto be added to the regression models and time zone would be dated back tothe past several years to see the changes after 2005 when the Reform ofEquity Separation began.
论文关键词： 公司治理；控股股东；盈余质量；琼斯模型；盈余管理；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibEt.cn Corporate governance, a systematic arrangement of various contracts in a firm, is a direct reflection of financial management environment. Corporate governance is closely related with financial management. Especially since Jensen and Meckling(1976) began the research on agent theory, corporate governance has become the focus of corporate finance. Corporate governance is concrete arrangement of the ownership and ownership is an abstract concept of corporate governance. Corporate governance of listed companies in our country is developing and evolving with the reform of state-owned enterprises and the improvement of the external security market. So it has a significant path-reliant characteristic though it has absorbed the advanced governance factors of the developed countries. Research of corporate governance based on ownership and agent theory accords with the building-up of modern enterprise system and satiies the demand of the reform of state-owned enterprises.Research in the past is mainly about the agent problem between the manager and the owner, but dispersive ownership only exists in several developed country such as the US, the UK. Most counties he relatively dispersive ownership and relatively concentrative control. (La porta1998; Claessens2000; Faccio and Lang 2002), Controlling shareholders, who play a key role in operation management, exist in many companies. Listed companies in China are tranerred from state-owned enterprises on which the old system shed shadow. It results in faulty internal governance, especially the ownership. Controlling shareholder and insider control are the popular problem in listed companies.Controlling shareholders make profit by occupying capital of listed companies, guarantee provided by listed companies, dividend and related parties transactions. The purpose of the listed companies is not only the maximum profit of itself but that of the whole group. The behior of the controlling shareholders certainly will influence the earning quality. Research in this field is meaningful to standardize corporate governance and enhance quality of listed companies and could propose policy suggestions to the authority.Scholars he different definition towards controlling shareholders, HuachengWang, YanTong (2006) substitutes the largest shareholder for controlling shareholder, SongZhu (2006) focuced on the final controller. So in China, whether the controlling shareholder are defined as the largest shareholder or the final controller? In the past, coefficient of market reaction signifies the influence of controlling shareholders on earning quality. But hypothesis of CAPM are not satiied for the weak efficiency of capital market in China. This paper defines the controlling shareholder under the Chinese environment and then use accounting adjustment method and time series method.This paper explains the systematic background of corporate governance and reviews literatures on corporate governance and earning quality. Listed companies from 2004 to 2005 are chose as samples, finance and real estate industry exclude. Controlling power is divided into four zones. The extent and character of the controlling shareholdersare considered. The study shows: Firstly, in the four zones, earning quality is positively related with circulating shares.Secondly, the proportion of controlling rights he significantly negative relation with earning quality, which is the same with research by Fan et al.(2005) and HuachengWang, YanTong( 2006) but different from SongZhu (2006) .For listed companies in China, as proportion of controlling rights increase, the agent cost of all shareholders increase will be larger than the decrease of agent cost of managers.Thirdly, cash flow rights he different relations with earbning quality in the zones. When the proportion of controlling rights exceed 70%, Dividend gains will be gained by earning management. So, ownership is negatively related with earning quality in highy controlled companies.Fourthly, for the first 3 zones, the higher deviation extent of the ownership and the controlling rights is, the lower the earning quality is, except when the controlling percentage exceeds 70% . These companies are state-ownedenterprises with all cash gains and more flexibility which leads to higherearning quality.Fifthly, the length of controlling chain is basically negatively related withearning quality, except for the lower controlling zone. Maybe in that zone, thebalanced shareholder percentage leads to the various supervision, whichincreases the earning quality.Sixthly, When the controlling shareholder is the state, significantly negativeeffect is shed on the earning quality.Seventhly, the length of controlling chain is positively related with earningquality for the state-owned companies, which is similar with Fan et al.(2005)and SongZhu (2006) . More controlling chain is caused by the release of thedecision rights. The increase of the controlling rights decreases thegovernment behior and enhances the earning quality.Eighthly, when controlling percentages of controlling shareholders is addedto model in whole sample,the results shows U-type describes the relationshipbetween earning quality and controlling ownership again.This paper focus on analysis of the controlling shareholders, adjustedRsquare is all. In the future, other controlling variables are recommendedto be added to the regression models and time zone would be dated back tothe past several years to see the changes after 2005 when the Reform ofEquity Separation began.
论文关键词： 公司治理；控股股东；盈余质量；琼斯模型；盈余管理；