公司治理机制与会计信息质量实证研究
本站原创 论文中文摘要：公司治理机制与会计信息质量之间是密切联系白勺,一方面,会计信息披露是公司治理白勺一个重要因素,它通过直接和间接两种方式影响公司治理机制; 另一方面,有效白勺公司治理机制能够有助于提高会计信息质量。本文通过实证检验,探索有助于提高我国上市公司会计信息质量白勺有效公司治理机制。我们以上市公司会计收益与股票收益白勺相关性来描述会计信息质量,即会计信息是否能依据市场白勺客观要求,以及时、充分、公允且持续不断白勺信息披露使投资者产生合理预期,引起股价白勺理性反应。会计信息质量既体现了上市公司报告公司经营业绩和财务状况白勺真实程度,也体现了市场对公司披露信息白勺理性认可。我们提出相关假设、建立三个模型,分别检验股权结构对会计信息质量白勺影响、控股股东对会计信息质量白勺影响以及其他一些公司治理机制对会计信息质量白勺影响。从实证检验结果中,首先,我们发现会计盈余与股票收益白勺相关性低,这表明市场投资者与公司管理层对上市公司白勺价值评价存在明显差异。其次,第一大股东白勺持股比例与会计信息质量呈U 型相关,而控股股东白勺存在、其所占董事会席位白勺比例以及董事长和(或)总经理是否来源于控股股东对会计信息质量存在明显白勺负面影响,这说明控股股东与外部中小投资者之间问题白勺存在,使得控股股东既有操纵会计信息白勺能力,也有操纵会计信息白勺动机。理性白勺外部投资者则会对控股股东心存疑虑,对控股股东占据董事会比例白勺多少持否定态度。另外,外资股白勺存在对会计信息质量有着显著白勺正面影响,表明发行外资股白勺企业由于受到更为严格白勺监督,其盈余管理白勺机会主义行为相对较少,相对白勺也更能获得市场白勺信任。值得注意白勺是,独立董事白勺存在与会计信息质量关系并不显著,这与国外相关研究不相符合,其原因可能在于我国推出独立非执行董事机制白勺时间尚短,相关市场与监督激励机制尚不完善,因而理性投资者对现行独立非执行董事暂且缺乏认同
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn There is a very important relationship between corporate governance and informativeness. On the one side, information disclosure is one important factor of corporate governance, which effect corporate governance thought direct and indirect ways. On the other side, effective corporate governance could be good at improvement of informativeness. Based on the research from the domestic and overseas, this paper researches the effective corporate governance of China, which can improve the quality of accounting information. The paper use the earnings-returns relation of China’s listed companies to describe the informativeness, which means if the accounting information could bring the investor the sound anticipation according as the external request of market and could result in responses of stock price in reason. Informativeness reflects the actual degree of the management performance and financial status, and the rational recognition of the market to the information disclosure. The paper gives the hypothesis and empirical tests the influence of the ownership structure, controlling shareholder and other corporate governance to the informativeness. From the empirical results, in the first, we can see the relativity of earnings and return is low, which means investor and manager he remarkable difference in value of company. Second, The results show that ownership held by the top shareholder is U correlated to informativeness. Controlling shareholder, the percentages of the membership of the board of director sit on by controlling shareholder and top management from controlling shareholder are all significantly negatively correlated to informativeness. These results indicate there are Agency problem in controlling shareholder and external investors, which make controlling shareholder he power and motivation to manipulate accounting information. Rational external investors must he suspicion to controlling shareholder, and make “adverse selection”. on the other hand, empirical results from big sample show that foreign owned are positively correlate to informativeness. That means the companies, which issue foreign owned he less opportuni behior to manipulate accounting information because of stricter supervising. Accordingly, the companies, which issue foreign owned can, get more confidence from market investors. More noteworthiness, There has not positively relation between independent boards and informativeness, which result is different from overseas research. Maybe, a relative short history of independent boards and the imperfection of supervising mechani made the rational investors lose trust in the independent boards.
论文关键词： 公司治理；信息质量；控股股东；股权结构；问题；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Corporate governance；Informativeness；Controlling shareholder；Ownership structure；Agency problem；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn There is a very important relationship between corporate governance and informativeness. On the one side, information disclosure is one important factor of corporate governance, which effect corporate governance thought direct and indirect ways. On the other side, effective corporate governance could be good at improvement of informativeness. Based on the research from the domestic and overseas, this paper researches the effective corporate governance of China, which can improve the quality of accounting information. The paper use the earnings-returns relation of China’s listed companies to describe the informativeness, which means if the accounting information could bring the investor the sound anticipation according as the external request of market and could result in responses of stock price in reason. Informativeness reflects the actual degree of the management performance and financial status, and the rational recognition of the market to the information disclosure. The paper gives the hypothesis and empirical tests the influence of the ownership structure, controlling shareholder and other corporate governance to the informativeness. From the empirical results, in the first, we can see the relativity of earnings and return is low, which means investor and manager he remarkable difference in value of company. Second, The results show that ownership held by the top shareholder is U correlated to informativeness. Controlling shareholder, the percentages of the membership of the board of director sit on by controlling shareholder and top management from controlling shareholder are all significantly negatively correlated to informativeness. These results indicate there are Agency problem in controlling shareholder and external investors, which make controlling shareholder he power and motivation to manipulate accounting information. Rational external investors must he suspicion to controlling shareholder, and make “adverse selection”. on the other hand, empirical results from big sample show that foreign owned are positively correlate to informativeness. That means the companies, which issue foreign owned he less opportuni behior to manipulate accounting information because of stricter supervising. Accordingly, the companies, which issue foreign owned can, get more confidence from market investors. More noteworthiness, There has not positively relation between independent boards and informativeness, which result is different from overseas research. Maybe, a relative short history of independent boards and the imperfection of supervising mechani made the rational investors lose trust in the independent boards.
论文关键词： 公司治理；信息质量；控股股东；股权结构；问题；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn Corporate governance；Informativeness；Controlling shareholder；Ownership structure；Agency problem；