自发性会计政策变更动机因素研究

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论文中文摘要:盈余管理作为上市公司操纵利润的一个方法,始终长期困扰着资本市场的监管当局。作为“盈余管理”的一种方法,会计政策变更经常被管理者用来调节企业利润,以实现企业价值最大化的目标。由于会计政策变更是在会计政策允许的情况下,达到调节公司利润的目的,以影响证券市场为最终目标,所以,威廉·R·司司脱教授形象的将其比喻成“摇尾巴狗”现象。由于经营管理层、投资者、债权人、监督管理机构以及其他利益相关者存在信息不对称,而且经营管理层对会计信息的了解处于绝对优势,这就使得他们可能利用这种优势来谋取不正当的利益。他们充分了解会计政策变更对公司当前及今后会计盈余、流量的影响,而其他利益相关者就很难得知会计政策变更对企业短期和长期价值的影响,所以必须依赖于公司会计信息的披露。但是目前我国会计信息披露水平还不能满足人们的要求,很多重要的、相关的信息都没有及时地披露,所以经营管理层就可能利用会计政策变更来操纵会计收益,从而达到获到更高的报酬、取得融资资格或者影响股价等目的。这类会计政策变更不仅将导致投资者的错误选择,打击投资者的信心,阻碍股市的正常发展,还容易产生内幕交易,造成公司内部人士的“信息优势”,产生抬高股价或打压股价以牟取暴利等现象,成为市场过度投机的主要根源。另外,随意变更会计政策也不利于上市公司的长远发展,扭曲了证券市场的基本功能,不容易正确评价上市公司的业绩、形成股价与公司业绩相匹配的市场机制,导致资源不能实现有效配置,严重威胁我国证券市场的健康发展。随着我国新会计准则陆续颁布,会计人员对于会计政策的选择范围扩大了。现阶段,企业会计政策变更到底出于什么动机呢?根据西方传统会计政策选择理论分析,一般都是调增利润,而我国上市公司却存在大量利润调减的情况。那么他们频频调减利润的动机又是什么呢?带着这些问题,本文综合运用了契约动机理论以及经济后果学说等西方经济学理论,加入一些适合中国国情的要素,通过实证分析来检验我国上市公司自发性会计政策变更的动机因素到底是什么,希望通过本文的研究能够为我国强化对自发性会计政策变更的政策监管,加强资本市场监督管理制度,提高投资者对盈利能力质量判断提供建议。本文主要内容如下:第一章:诸论。主要阐述了本文的写作背景、理论意义、现实意义,以及本篇论文的主要贡献、局限性以及主要框架内容。第二章:自发性会计政策变更研究的发展历程。本章分为两个部分,第一部分大概介绍了自发性会计政策变更及其相关概念;第二部分介绍了国内外会计政策变更研究的发展历程以及对其客观评价。‘第三章:自发性会计政策变更的理论分析及其研究假设。本文先简要阐述了理解本文逻辑所需要的西方经济学理论、实证会计理论,并且结合我国证券市场的具体情况,从理论上分析了自发性会计政策变更的动机因素,提出了6个研究假设:(一)政治成本假设。H1:企业规模与自发性会计政策变更正相关。(二)报酬契约假设。H2:报酬契约与自发性会计政策变更正相关。(三)债务契约假设。H3:资产负债率与自发性会计政策估计变更正相关。(四)证券市场监管效应假设。H4a:大亏公司与自发性会计政策变更正相关。H4b:微利公司与自发性会计政策变更正相关。H4c:高盈利公司与自发性会计政策变更正相关。H4d:ST公司与自发性会计政策正相关。(五)经营盈利能力假设。H5:净资产收益率与自发性会计政策变更负相关。(六)大亏并且高级管理人员变更假设。H6:公司大亏且高管人员变更与自发性会计政策变更正相关。第四章:研究设计。本章主要对后文实证检验中用到的样本数据的选择、来源以及模型和变量进行介绍,为后文实证检验奠定基础。本文主要数据来源于CAR数据库,部分无法直接获得的数据采用手工收集。选取2003-2005年非金融类A股上市公司,并剔除了部分异常值的公司数据,最后得到样本,采用模型进行回归分析。第五章:实证检验结果及分析。使用SPSS统计软件,对前文提出的几个假设变量进行描述性统计,单因素分析、Logistic回归及多元回归分析,并做出初步结论。第六章:结论及政策建议。本章对全文的研究结果进行总结,并提出了如下的6个政策建议:(1)建立高质量的企业会计准则;(2)重新制定评价企业经营水平的指标体系;(3)规范企业的公司治理结构;(4)完善对公司高级管理人员的激励和约束机制。(5)加强CPA独立执业以及注册会计师行业的监管。(6)实施管理者回避制度。本文根据实证结果分析得出以下结论:首先,2003-2005年期间,上市公司自发性会计政策变更整体上呈现调减利润的变动趋势,发生自发性会计变更的公司主要以经营业绩和财务状态很差的大亏公司和ST公司为主,经营业绩和财务状况越差,利润变动的影响额就越大,“大清洗”的动机非常明显。由此可见,对证券市场监管规定的迎合和规避是上市公司自发性会计政策变更的最终目标,是否发生自发性会计政策变更,受到证券市场监管规定的制约。业绩较差的微利公司和业绩很差的大亏公司均通过自发性会计变更调节利润,以保持其上市资格;而高盈利公司也将自发性会计变更当作经常性调节利润的手段。这一状态的延续必将影响证券市场的资源优化配置,不利于证券市场的长远发展。其次,我国上市公司自发性会计政策变更主要表现为会计估计变更。由于会计估计变更空间更大,自主性更强,企业容易操作,而且想要通过缩小会计选择的空间来减少上市公司通过自发性会计变更在证券市场上的寻租比较困难,所以完善证券市场监管规定才是减少上市公司会计寻租、优化资源配置的主要途径。再次,西方实证会计理论的三大假设在我们国家大部分都没有得到证明,主要可能还是基于我们国家现阶段的国情所决定的,股市更为“政策市”、“资金市”。最后,通过本文的研究还发现在上市公司业绩大亏且高级管理人员变更的情况下,会出现新任高级管理人员计提“秘密准备”,对现有利润进行“大清洗”的可能。本文研究的主要贡献体现在以下两个方面:(1)采用广义的会计政策变更的概念。从以往研究的文献来看,我国对于会计政策变更范围的选择主要针对的是会计政策选择中的会计政策变更或者是会计估计变更的某一方面,并没有将两者结合起来进行研究。而在客观实际运用中,无论是会计政策变更还是会计估计变更都是存在的,忽视其中的任何一类都是造成会计信息失真的一个重要原因,因此扩大研究范围就显得尤为重要。所以本文研究的范围扩充到广义的会计政策变更概念的范围。(2)本文探索了上市公司自发性会计政策变更之证券市场监督效应及其表现。研究发现上市公司对证券市场监督规定的迎合和规避是自发性会计政策变更最终的目标。总体上看,西方国家大多数都是调增利润,而我国不少上市公司却是利用会计政策选择来调减利润,除了需要扭亏的企业和少数微利企业为避免亏损而调增利润外,大亏企业为“大清洗”而调减利润;高盈利企业也将自发性会计政策变更作为经常性调减利润的手段之一。作为会计政策变更的内容之一,坏账准备计提和折旧计提程序等的变更,始终是上市公司的首选方法。另外,发生会计估计变更也多于会计政策变更,因为我们的准则使得“会计的灵活性”越来越大。因此,依靠缩小会计政策选择空间来减少上市公司通过自发性会计政策变更的行为比较困难。所以我们只有从制度上来根本约束随意对会计政策进行变更的公司。本文也还存在一些不足,主要体现在:第一,由于我国证券市场起步较晚,并且会计准则强制性变更较为频繁,因而使得本文研究的时间跨度不长,无法做时间序列;第

二、由于自发性会计政策变更的公司数量还是比较少,使得结论的普遍性受到影响

Abstract(英文摘要): As a way that listed companies to manipulate profits, earnings management has long bedeviled the regulatory authority of capital markets.In order to achieve the goal of maximizing corporate value, accounting methods changes as a way of earnings management, always used to regulating profits. As the accounting method changes was permitted by accounting policy fqr regulating company’s profits,and effect stock price in the end.professor William compare it to "dog wags the tail" phenomenon.There always exists asymmetric information between management, investors, creditors, regulatory authority and other stakeholder. Because the management knows much more accounting information, they can use this advantage to seek improper interests.They fully understand the impact of the accounting methods changes on the company’s current and future accounting earnings and cash flow. However, other stakeholders are not ailable to know the influence of the accounting methods changes on the firm’s short-term and long-term value. They just rely on the information disclosure. For the accounting information disclosure can not meet the requirements of the people, the management may use the accounting methods changes to manipulate accounting earnings, in order to get a higher remuneration, to obtain qualifications or to affect stock allotment. In addition, accounting methods changes like these will not only lead to wrong choice of investors,against investors’confidence, hamper the normal development of the stock market, but also prone to insider trading, resulting in the company insiders "information superiority",which will elevate or suppress the stock price. Changing accounting methods randomly will harm the long-term development of the firm, and distort the basic function of the securities market, and show incorrect information of the firm’s performance. And finally it will result in inefficient allocation of resource, which is a serious threat to the healthy development of our securities market. As China has successively promulgated the new accounting standards, accountants he more choices with the policies.At present, what is the motivation of accounting methods changes? According to t accounting methods changes of western countries, the firms normally get their profit higher. However, in our country, the listed companies just get their profit lower. Why are they frequently reducing the profit? With this problem, we consider the economic consequences of contract theory and other Western economic theory under our special situation. We use an empirical analysis of China’s listed companies to find out the motivation of voluntary accounting methods changes.And we want to get insights of strengthen the supervision of the voluntary accounting methods changes, and make the investors he accurate information.This paper is organized as follows.In chapter 1,we introduce the background, theoretic significance, practical implications of this paper are described, and the innovative works of this article.In chapter2,we describe the development process of changes in voluntary accounting methods Study. This chapter is divided into two parts.In the first part, the changes in voluntary accounting methods and some related concepts are described; in the second section the development processes as well as its objective evaluation in research of changes about the accounting methods both at home and abroad are introduced.In chapter3,we analyze changes in voluntary accounting policy and propose hypothesizes of our study.1:Political cost hypothesis. H1:Enterprise scale is positively related to changes in voluntary accounting methods2:Compensation contract hypothesis. H2:Compensation contract is positively related to changes in voluntary accounting methods3:Debt contract hypothesis. H3:the Asset-liability ratio positively related to the estimation of changes in voluntary accounting methods4:the hypothesis of regulatory effect in Securities market H4a:the variables of in a company with voluntary accounting methods changing are significantly higher than the sample companies with control variables. H4b:The Low-profit variables in a company with voluntary accounting methods changing are significantly higher than the sample companies with control variables. H4c:The High-profit variables in a company with voluntary accounting methods changing are significantly higher than the sample companies with control variables. H4d:the variables of ST Company with voluntary accounting methods changing are significantly higher than the sample companies with control variables.5:Operating profitability assumptions H5:The ROE of the Company with Voluntary changes in accounting methods is significantly less than the company with non-voluntary changes of accounting methods, and the changes in voluntary accounting methods he a negative correlation with the amount of affect profit.6:the assumption of Burned by and the shifts of senior managers H6:The variables of burned by and shifts of senior managers in a company with changes in Voluntary the accounting policy are significantly higher than the companies with non-voluntary changesChapter 4:Research Design.In this chapter, the mainly chooses, sources, models and variables of the sample data used in the later empirical tests are introduced which laid a foundation for later empirical tests.The data in this paper are from the CAR database, some data which he no direct access are collected manually. A sample is got by excluding some outliers of the corporate data which Selected in the 2003-2005 non-financial A-share listed companies,using models are used to do some regression analysis.Chapter 5:Results and Analysis.The SPSS statistical software is used to descriptively statistics the assumptions variables made in the earlier. Single factor analysis, Logistic regression and multiple regression analysis are also used to make a preliminary conclusion.Chapter 6:Conclusions, policy recommendations and the limitations.In this chapter, the research the findings of this paper are summarized and 6 policy recommendations are proposed as follows: (1):establish a high-quality corporate accounting standards; (2):Redefining the evaluation index system of enterprise operation standards (3):Regulate the corporate governance structure (4):Improve the incentive and restraint mechanis to company’s senior managers (5):strengthen the supervision of CPA’s Independent practice and CPA industry. (6):implement the system of Managers-oiding.The innovative works to related theories in this article are in the following two aspects.(1)Expand the study scope.From the data of previous studies, the choice for the scope of accounting methods changes in our nation aimed only at the accounting methods changes or a certain category of change in accounting estimates, and did not research with both of them combined. The accounting methods changes or the accounting estimation change both existed in the objectively reality application. Neglect any of them will be a vital cause for the distortion of accounting information. So enlarging the scope of the study becomes particularly important.(2)This article explores the listed company voluntary effect of accounting change and its manifestations of the securities market supervision. We find that the ultimate goal of the listed companies’accounting methods changes is to meet or oid the supervision of the securities market. Overall, the firms in Western countries get higher profits, while many listed companies in our country choose to get their profit lower. We also find businesses burned by the "Great Purge" reduce profits. And unprofitable firms and a few low-profit firms in order to oid losses, they make profits higher; high-profit-making enterprises take the voluntary accounting methods changes as a way to adjust their profits.The change of bad debts provision and the procedures of depreciation provision has always been the preferred method for the listed company.Finally, we find that changes in accounting estimates are also more than the accounting methods changes, because our criteria makes the accounting more flexible. So,it is difficult to reduce the listed companies’voluntary accounting methods changes by reducing the choices space of methods. And we can only make a system constraint on the listed companies which change their accounting methods randomly. This article also has some inadequacies, mainly reflected in these aspects: Firstly, as China’s securities market started late, and the mandatory accounting standards change more frequently, thus the time span of this study is not long enough to do time series; Secondly, the number of companies which he voluntary accounting methods changes is still relatively all, so maybe the universality of the conclusions are affected.
论文关键词: 自发性会计政策变更;会计政策变更;证券市场监管效应;
Key words(英文摘要): Voluntary Accounting Method Changes;Accounting Method Changes;Regulatory effect in Securities market;