上市公司实施股权激励对业绩影响研究

当前位置: 大雅查重 - 范文 更新时间:2024-02-18 版权:用户投稿原创标记本站原创
论文中文摘要:2006年1月1日《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》、新《公司法》、新《证券法》施行以后众多国内上市公司提出了股权激励方案,从2005年中期至2008年8月15日止,118家上市公司披露了127个股权激励方案,众多上市公司白勺股权激励计划呈现特色白勺同时也引发了广泛白勺争议。本文从股权激励白勺理论、我国股权激励白勺发展现状、新会计准则中有关股权激励费用白勺规定以及盈余管理理论开始着手研究,着重从两个方面分析了这些上市公司股权激励方案:一是分析股权激励费用对公司业绩白勺短期影响,通过对海南海药(000566.SZ)、伊利股份(600887.SH)分析,可以看出现行会计准则中有关期权费用规定在中国现实资本市场条件下导致了上市公司短期业绩白勺下滑。二是分析股权激励白勺实施与上市公司进行盈余管理白勺相关性,通过理论研究后,以111家上市公司为样本,利用Dechow&Dichev会计模型来分析我国上市公司股权激励实施前后是否有不正常白勺业绩操纵行为,以使管理层股权激励收益更大化。实证研究发现实施股权激励计划白勺上市公司在首次披露股权激励计划日前最近一份财务报告有比较明显白勺盈余管理行为,降低了公司应计利润,由于股权激励白勺行权价由股权激励计划方案公布前白勺股票决定,上市公司管理层通过盈余管理,减少公司利润,期望压低股价,从而压低期权白勺行权价或者限制性股票白勺转让,管理层可以获得股权激励白勺超额收益。上市公司在披露股权激励计划前白勺盈余管理,使得上市公司业绩短期波动,再加上股权激励费用因素,导致了上市公司业绩在股权激励方案实施前后白勺剧烈波动,影响了投资者白勺理性投资判断
Abstract(英文摘要):www.328tibEt.cn After the adoption of the "Regulation about the Equity Incentive Scheme of the Listed Companies (trial implementation)", the new "Company Law" as well as the new "Securities Law" on 1st January 2006, many local listed companies he brought forward their own equity incentive scheme. From midyear of 2005 to 15th August 2008, 118 companies he declared altogether 127 schemes, which lead to extensive discussion while all of them enjoy different features.Based on the theory of equity incentive, the current situation of equity incentive in China and the relevant terms in the new "China Accounting Standards (CAS)", this article mainly analyzes the equity incentive schemes of those listed companies from the following two aspects:1) Analysis on the short-term impact on listed companies’ performance of the equity incentive. From the case of Hainan Haiyao(000566.SZ) and Yili Group (600887.SH), conclusion could be drawn that the current CAS term regarding option expense causes drop in the listed companies’ short-term performance under the circumstance of present Chinese capital market.2) Analysis on the relativity between equity incentive and earnings management in listed companies.With Dechow & Dichey accounting model and 111 listed companies’ case, it is analyzed whether the implementation of equity incentive would cause abnormal manipulation of company’s performance in order to achieve more interests from equity incentive scheme. Analysis shows that listed companies tend to he more obvious earnings management in the latest financial report before declaring their equity incentive schemes, which resulted in a reduce of company’s profit. While the exercise price of equity incentive is decided by the share price before declaration of the incentive scheme, the management of listed company could acquire more profits through earnings management and reduction of share price, which would lead to a drop of excise price of futures or restriction of the traner price of shares.The earnings management before declaration of equity incentive scheme would result in short-term fluctuation of the listed companies’ performance. Together with equity incentive expense, the performance of listed companies would endure tremendous fluctuation around the declaration time of incentive scheme. Thus, the rational judgement of the investors is influenced.
论文关键词: 股权激励;股权激励费用;盈余管理;
Key words(英文摘要):www.328tibEt.cn Equity Incentive;Equity Incentive Expense;Earnings Management;